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The security of the electrical power grid is crucial to any country’s economy.
Modern power grids use information systems, such as supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA), to monitor and control the grid. Current SCADA
systems are vulnerable to cyber-attacks, i.e., those attacks which compromise
the information system. Cyber security deals with understanding, detecting,
analyzing, and mitigating cyber-attacks. In this thesis, a framework is proposed
and built to analyze the cyber security and resiliency of power systems.
There are broadly three types of cyber-attacks on power systems: data avail-
ability attacks, data integrity attacks, and privacy attacks. This thesis focuses
only on the first two types of attacks. The first step in a cyber security strategy
is to quantify the impact of the cyber-attack. Specifically, we propose methods
to quantify the impact of data availability attacks on power system operations.
Next, we propose methods to mitigate the effects of data availability and data in-
tegrity attacks. For the data availability attack, we propose methods to perform
load forecasting and state estimation when part of the system data is unavailable.
For the data integrity attack, we propose methods to detect false data injections
and topology errors. Finally, we study strategies to optimally allocate resources
to defend against such cyber-attacks.
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Electrical power grids deliver electricity from generators to consumers. To effi-
ciently and reliably deliver the electricity, modern power grids generally contain
two layers, current carrying layer and information layer [2]. Electricity flows in
the current carrying layer, which includes generators, transmission lines, circuit
breakers, etc. The information layer which is also known as supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) system, includes multiple remote terminal units
(RTUs) and control centers.
The RTU collects status data of the power grid, such as voltage magnitude and
current flow. These data will be sent to the control center for further process.
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Inside the control center, data from the RTUs will be passed to the energy man-
agement system (EMS) for several important functions, including state estima-
tion, contingency analysis, etc [3]. If necessary, the EMS will suggest the control
center to send commands (e.g. shed load, open circuit breaker) to reconfigure
the grid.
Communication links between RTUs and control centers are established in var-
ious forms, including satellite, optical fiber, telephone, microwave, and others
[3]. These communication links are not 100% reliable due to unintentional and
intentional causes. The unintentional causes include aging of the communication
equipment, malfunction of the communication equipment and faulty operations.
The intentional causes are predominately cyber-attacks. These unintentional
and intentional causes could lead to communication failure.
Communication failures on power grids can have significant negative impact.
One of them is system observability. The power grid control center relies on
data gathered from substations to perform state estimation. If the communica-
tion between the RTU and the control center is blocked, the control center may
not be able to perform state estimation. Another important impact of communi-
cation failure is system control. In an emergency situation, if the communication
channel of the power grid is congested, RTUs may not be able to receive impor-
tant commands, such as load shedding. If overload is not shed timely, it could
lead to cascading effects and rolling blackouts. By studying the impact of com-
munication failure on power grids, we can give valuable suggestions to improve
the current information system of the power grid.
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Communication failure on power grids also affects load forecasting which is an
important process in the power grid operation. Existing load forecasting tech-
niques reach their limitations when communication failure and continuous data
loss occur. This is because current load forecasting techniques depend on the
correlation with data from the few most recent measurements. These forecasting
techniques are not designed to handle the situation where new load measurements
are not fed to the system. Forecasting errors using existing techniques will be
accumulated. It is thus necessary to develop a new load forecasting technique to
handle the communication failure situations.
Another important EMS function that will be affected by communication failure
is state estimation which is the primary function in the power system energy
management system. Other functions in the EMS, such as contingency analysis,
generation planning, economic dispatch, all rely on the results from the state
estimation [3]. Thus state estimation is a crucial function of the EMS. Current
state estimation methods rely on real-time measurement data gathered from
RTUs. When communication failure occurs, multiple measurement data can
become unavailable. Existing state estimation techniques can not estimate the
system state accurately under such situations. A new state estimation method
is needed to accurately estimate the power system state under communication
failure.
Apart from the communication failure caused by data availably attacks, power
grid information systems are also facing threats of data integrity attacks that
manipulate the original monitoring and control data. Undetected data integrity
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attack can cause significant impact to the grid and disrupt the EMS function-
ality. For the state estimation function in EMS, if the data integrity attacks
are independent, these attacks can be detected using residual analysis from the
existing bad data detection method [4, 5]. However, recent research found that
a new type of data integrity attack called false data injection attack can pass
the traditional bad data detection in state estimation [6]. If these new false data
injection attacks are not detected, system operator will have a wrong picture of
the grid. Thus it is important to find a method to detect false data injection
attacks.
Data integrity attacks can also cause topology errors (e.g. closed circuit breaker
considered as open). Situational unawareness caused by topology errors can
cause large rolling blackouts. Existing topology error detection methods are
based on DC state estimation with residual analysis. These detection techniques
use only instantaneous measurement data and require convergence of numerical
solution. A better solution is needed for topology error detection.
Defending the power grid against cyber-attacks requires resources. Due to the
limited defense resources, it is usually not possible or efficient to allocate defense
resources throughout the grid. Thus, estimating the behaviors of the attackers
and strategically allocating defense resources are important for most power grids




To understand and analyze power system cyber security, this thesis is divided
into four more specific objectives: literature review, impact analysis, mitigation
methods and mitigation strategies. These four objectives follow a specific order













Figure 1.1: Thesis structure
• The literature review in chapter 2 covers two main aspects: information
systems in power grids (e.g. SCADA) and cyber threats to power grids.
The literature view on information systems includes hardware infrastruc-
ture of the SCADA system and functionality of the energy management
system. The literature review on cyber threats covers different types of
cyber-attacks on the power grid. The literature review provides a good
understanding of the latest research on power system cyber security.
• After understanding the potential cyber threats, the first step of defense is
to quantify the impact of cyber-attacks. Thus the second research objective
is to quantify the impact of cyber-attacks on the power grid. Specifically,
new methods are proposed in chapter 3 to quantify the impact of data
availability attacks on power system operations. This is an important
process because it gives system operators a better understanding of the
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cyber issues in the power grid. It also helps system operators to better
prepare defense mechanism and remedial actions to mitigate these attacks.
• The third research objective is to propose mitigation methods against
cyber-attacks to the grid. These mitigation methods will be focused on
power system aspect, not on computer science aspect. In this thesis, sev-
eral new mitigation methods are proposed for data availability attacks in
chapter 4 & 5 and data integrity attacks in chapter 6 & 7.
• The fourth research objective is to design an optimal strategy for allocating
defense resources. Given limited resources, how to optimally allocate these
resources is an important research topic. A new method is proposed in
chapter 8 to find the optimal defense strategy.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis including:
• Power system cyber security is a new research topic with limited exiting
literature. In this thesis, we have done a careful literature review which
includes the structure of power grid information systems and cyber threats




• Proposal of methods to quantify the impact of communication failure on
state estimation and load shedding. Based on the quantifying of the result,
optimal improvement methods are also provided.
• Proposal of method to perform load forecasting under communication fail-
ure. Existing load forecasting techniques cannot accurately forecast the
load when communication failure and continuous data loss occur. The
proposed method can forecast load under communication failure.
• Proposal of a new dynamic state estimation technique to accurately esti-
mate system state under communication failure. The proposed technique is
fast, accurate and can handle situations where existing techniques cannot
handle.
• Apart from the data availability attack, this thesis also covers data integrity
attacks. One of these attacks is called false data injection attack. This
thesis has proposed methods to detect false data injection attacks which
cannot be detected using existing methods.
• Data integrity attack can cause topology error. This thesis proposes new
method to detect topology error from a new perspective. The proposed
method improves the existing topology error detection methods.
• Proposal of method to find the optimal defense strategy against potential
cyber-attacks on the power system. The proposed method helps system




The remaining chapters of this thesis are organized as follow:
• Chapter 2 is the literature review. It summarizes the latest work on infor-
mation system of the power grid and potential cyber threats to the power
grid.
• Chapter 3 proposes a method to quantify the impact of communication
failure on power system observability and power system control. Based
on the impact analysis, optimal improvement method is provided in this
chapter.
• Chapter 4 proposes a new technique to perform load forecasting under
communication failure. The proposed technique overcomes the limitation
of existing load forecasting techniques and can accurately forecast the load
under communication failure.
• Chapter 5 extends the work in the previous chapter. In this chapter, a
new method is proposed to perform state estimation under communication
failure.
• Chapter 6 focuses on false data injection attack which can pass the tra-
ditional detection methods. A new method is proposed in this chapter to
detect this newly discovered attack.
• Chapter 7 studies topology error detection. In this chapter, a new tech-
nique is proposed to detect topology error.
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• Chapter 8 combines the impact analysis from chapter 3 and game theory
to find an optimal defense strategy for the system operator.




This literature review chapter includes two parts. The first part explains the
information system of modern power grids. The second part discusses potential
cyber-attacks on power grids.
2.1 Power Grid Information System
The information system is an important part of modern power grids. This section
covers three aspects of the power grid information system: structure, function-
ality and protocol.
2.1.1 Information System Structure
Modern power grids generally contain two layers, the current carrying layer and
the information layer [2, 7]. Electricity flows in the current carrying layer, which
10
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Figure 2.1: Power-grid communication today[1]
includes generators, transmission lines, circuit breakers, etc. The information
layer which is also known as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
system, includes multiple remote terminal units (RTUs) and control centers,
as shown in Fig 2.1. The information layer relies on various communication
technologies to monitor and control the grid.
2.1.1.1 RTU
Modern power grids contain multiple RTUs which are usually attached to sub-
stations. These substations can be geographically far apart. In each substation,
11
Chapter 2. The Fundamentals
there are several intelligent electronic devices(IED) that measure analog and dis-
crete data of the power grid. The analog data include bus voltage magnitude,
active power flow, etc. Some substations are equipped with a newly developed
phase measurement unit (PMU) which is capable of measuring bus phase an-
gle and reactive power flow. Apart from the analog data, the substation also
measures discrete data which includes circuit breaker status and alarm status.
Both analog and discrete data will be sent back to the control center for further
processing.
2.1.1.2 Control Center
The control center is the central nerve system of modern power grids. It operates
24 hours a day, 7 days a week to make sure that the grid is operating properly.
It monitors and controls the whole power grid. To properly monitor the grid,
control center relies on the data sent from RTUs. These data gathered from RTUs
will be automatically sent back to the control center. It will first go through a
process called bad data detection which filters corrupted data. After that, these
data will be processed in the energy management system inside the control center.
The EMS utilizes these data to perform several important functions such as state
estimation and contingency analysis. These functions help the grid to operate
at near optimal state.
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2.1.2 Functionality and Requirements
The SCADA system has multiple functions that can be broadly divided into two
categories: Monitoring and Controlling [8].
2.1.2.1 Monitoring
Monitoring encompasses all the functions that are designed to inform the op-
erator about the state of the power grid. Some of these functions provide raw
data such as the status of switching devices or measurements of voltage or power
flow. Other functions process the raw data to provide higher-value information
to the operator. In the control center, the security analysis software uses the out-
put of the state estimator to identify potentially dangerous situation and warn
the operator about the need to take preventive actions or prepare for corrective
actions.
2.1.2.2 Controlling
The control functions enables operator to remotely control and operate equip-
ments at substations. Some control functions in the SCADA system are auto-
matic, like automatic generation control and system integrity protections schemes.
These control functions are implemented to automatically correct the grid when
a stability threatening situation is detected. Other control functions are devel-
oped to assist operators. For example, the SCADA system can implement a load
shedding scheme that prioritize certain loads (e.g. hospital).
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2.1.2.3 Energy Management System
The energy management system (EMS) in the power grid is a major extension
of the SCADA system. It uses advanced computer programs to utilize the mon-
itoring and control functionality of the SCADA system to perform higher level
analysis task in the power grid. These tasks include: [3]
• Load Forecasting: An important function of the EMS. It is useful for energy
purchasing, generation planning and infrastructure development.
• State estimation: It uses raw measurement data to calculate critical grid
information such as load flows.
• Contingency analysis: A software program that simulates the outcome of
potential equipment failure.
• Emergency load shedding: This function enables operator to quickly dis-
connect certain load during an emergency. It is an important function
because it can prevent large scale blackout.
There are many other functions in the EMS such as transmission stability anal-
ysis, dynamic security analysis, power flow analysis, economic dispatch, reactive
power scheduling, dynamic reserves analysis, and etc. All these functions rely
on a working SCADA system. Failure of communication between RTUs and the
control center disables EMS. Historical events show that large-scale blackouts
are usually linked to communication system failure[9] .
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2.1.3 Communication Protocol
In the power grid information system, different types of data have different fre-
quency and latency requirements. Some more critical data, such as voltage mag-
nitude requires higher measurement frequency and lower transmission latency.
Other noncritical data, such as log data can be sent in a lower frequency. To
meet different demands, there are various forms of communication protocol and
equipments such as fiber, radio and satellite communication.
In power grid information system, communication protocols are redefined rules
that enable the exchange of information between the intelligent electronic device,
RTU and control center. There are quite a few protocols used in the modern
power grids. The most widely used protocols are: modicon communication bus
(Modbus), inter control center protocol (ICCP) and distributed network protocol
(DNP3).
• Modbus is the simplest and most widely used protocol. It is typically
used between programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and human machine
interfaces (HMIs). However, Modbus lacks authentication and encryption.
• ICCP is used for communication between control centers. It enables control
centers to establish connections and exchange information. ICCP also lacks
authentication and encryption.
• DNP3 is a popular and reliable protocol. It is primarily used between the
control center and RTUs. A secured DNP3 includes authentication but
there are known exploits.
15
Chapter 2. The Fundamentals
More detail information on these communication protocols can be found in [10].
Since these communication protocols were initially designed for a closed network,
they usually lack security features. Besides, these protocols are often publicly
accessible which means an attacker can easily decode these protocols. Thus the
current power grids are not safe against cyber-attacks.
2.2 Cyber-Attacks
In recent years, several researchers have discussed the possibility of cyber-attacks
on power grids [11–13]. According to [14], cyber-attacks can be classified into
three categories: data integrity attacks, data availability attacks and privacy
attacks, as shown in Fig. 2.2
Cyber-Attacks
Data Integrity Data Availability Privacy
Measurement Control Delay Block
Figure 2.2: Cyber-Attacks Classification
2.2.1 Data Integrity Attacks
Data integrity attacks refer to attacks that manipulate the original communica-
tion data, which can be further classified into measurement data from RTUs and
control data from control centers.
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Measurement data from RTUs are used for monitoring the grid operation. Tam-
pered measurement data might cause the control center to wrongly estimate the
grid status. Even though the measurement data needs to pass through the bad
data detection, research shows that it is possible for an attacker to bypass the
bad data detection[6]. This type of attack is called bad data injection attack,
which requires an attacker to have knowledge of the power grid structure and
manipulate several measurements at the same time.
The manipulated measurement data can cause system operators to make wrong
decisions. Reference [15] shows that tampered sensor reading makes the power
grid unstable. Another type of data integrity attack is called load redistribute
attack, which manipulates load measurement and causes increase of total elec-
tricity generation cost [16, 17].
Compared with measurement data, manipulating the control data can cause more
severe damages. Researchers have studied different attack scenarios, including
unauthorized opening of circuit breakers[13, 18, 19], attack on automatic gener-
ation control [20–22] and manipulate load [23].
2.2.2 Data Availability Attacks
Data availability attacks refer to attacks that block the communication links be-
tween RTUs and control centers. One possible way of data availability attack is
to physically sabotage the communication equipment. Modern substations are
usually unmannedand can easily become targets for terrorists. Thus it is impor-
tant to set up peripheral security to protect the equipments in the substations.
17
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Apart from physical attacks, cyber-attacks can also block the communication
links. One typical cyber-attack is called denial of service (DoS) attack, which
delays or blocks communication by using up the network resources. A DoS attack
is easy to implement but difficult to counter [24]. Reference [25] proves that DoS
attack can cause communication delay between RTUs and control centers.
2.2.3 Privacy
Compared with data integrity and availability attacks, privacy attacks have less
direct impact on the grid operation. But it is still an important issue for both
individual and industrial electricity consumers. For individual consumers, the
electricity consumption pattern can reveal whether the individual is at home or
at work, or even traveling. The electricity load also tells what type of appliances
are being used. For industrial consumers, electricity consumption links to change




Failure on Power System
Operations
3.1 Overview
Communication technology serves important functions in the power system en-
ergy management system (EMS). Recent studies found that cyber-attack and
terrorist attack can cause failure of power system communication which affects
EMS in various ways. This chapter analyzes two impacts of communication fail-
ure on EMS, namely, system observability and system control. The first impact
on system observability is studied using DC state estimation to identify unob-
servable states when loss of communication occurs at various locations. The
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second impact on system control is studied using DC OPF to find the loss of
load caused by communication failure. Simulation studies on the two analyses
are conducted on IEEE 14 bus and IEEE 30 bus systems. Results show that
certain substations are more critical for system observability. Optimal upgrade
strategy is provided in this chapter to improve system observability. It is also
shown that failure of communication will cause extra loss of load. By protecting
certain substations, the system can expect less loss of load. It is concluded that
communication system is crucial to the power system operation. This chapter
also gives suggestion to optimally improve communication systems.
3.2 Introduction
Communication technology is widely used in supervisory control and data acqui-
sition (SCADA) system of Power Grid. SCADA serves the function of monitoring
and controlling the grid. SCADA system generally includes control centers and
remote terminal units (RTU)[3]. RTUs gather system data at substations. These
data will be sent to the control center. Inside the control center, data from RTUs
will be passed to EMS for several important functions, including state estimation,
contingency analysis, etc[3]. If necessary, EMS will suggest the control center
to send commands to RTUs to reconfigure the grid. Communication between
RTUs and the control center can be in different forms, failure of communication
will make the overall system operation at risk.
20
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3.2.1 Power System Communication
Power systems can be considered as containing two layers, current carrying layer
and information layer [2]. Electricity flows in current carrying layer, which in-
cludes generators, transmission lines, circuit breakers, etc. Information layer
which is also known as SCADA system, includes multiple RTUs and control cen-
ters. The information layer relies on communication technology to monitor and
control the grid. There are multiple forms of communication between RTU and
a control center. It can be fiber, radio or satellite communication. These com-
munications use different protocols. The most widely used protocols are DNP3.0
for US and IEC 60870-5 for Europe[7]. These protocols are publicly accessible,
which makes it a potential threat to SCADA security. Once the information
layer is broken, system operator will lose control of the grid. In this chapter,
We focus our analysis on the information layer of the system, which is explained
below.
3.2.1.1 RTU
RTU is usually attached to a substation. Different substations can be geo-
graphically far apart. In each substation, there are several measuring devices.
These devices measure analog and discrete data. Analog data includes bus volt-
age magnitude, active power flow. If the substation has a phase measurement
unit (PMU), it can measure the bus phase angle. Discrete data includes circuit
breaker status and alarm status. All these measured data will be sent back to
the control center for processing. Different types of data need to meet different
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communication requirements. Some of them are more urgent than others. For
example, measurement data are sent in a higher frequency than log data. Apart
from sending measurement data, RTU also receives commands from the con-
trol center to reconfigure substations. These commands include opening circuit
breakers, load shedding and changing transformer tap positions.
3.2.1.2 Control Center
Control center gathers data from RTUs. These data will be processed in EMS. In-
side the EMS, raw data first go through state estimation to filter bad data. After
that, EMS uses these data to do contingency analysis and several other func-
tions. EMS helps the grid to operate at near optimal state. All these functions
rely on a functioning SCADA system. Failure of communication between RTUs
and the control center disables EMS. History shows that large-scale blackouts
are usually not initiated by communication failure, but after the initial fault,
cascading effects are mostly caused by communication system failure[9, 26] .
These communication failures can be caused by malfunctions of communication
equipments or from cyber-attacks.
3.2.2 Cyber Threats on Power System
Given the importance of SCADA systems to power grid, cyber security of the
SCADA system becomes a crucial issue. The current SCADA system was de-
signed decades ago as an internal network with limited access points. SCADA
vendor used to provide only limited security features. With the development of
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smart grid, which relies more heavily on information system, cyber security issue
becomes even more severe. Governments and authorities are therefore working
on developing a security framework for power systems [27, 28] .
This chapter studies the impacts of communication failure on power system oper-
ations. Two types of impacts are analyzed in this chapter: system observability
and load shedding control. Section II discusses system unobservability caused
by communication failures. If a control center cannot receive data from certain
RTUs, the system will become unobservable. We enumerate a list of commu-
nication scenarios that lead the system to become unobservable. Results show
that certain substations are more important than others for system observability.
We then suggest the locations for substation upgrade to reduce the risk of the
system becomes unobservable. Section III discusses how communication failure
will affect power system control. We utilize DC OPF to find the optimal loss of
load when there are communication failures between control center and RTUs.
Result shows that failure of certain communication links between the control
center and RTUs causes extra loss of load. Section IV provides case study for
the above two studies using IEEE 14 and 30 bus system. Case study shows the
importance of communication network to power systems. Conclusions are given
in Section V.
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3.3 POWER SYSTEM UNOBSERVABLE ANALY-
SIS
One impact of communication failure is system observability. The power system
control center uses data gathered from substations to perform state estimation.
If communication between the RTU and the control center is blocked, the control
center may not be able to perform state estimation. This section of this chapter
will discuss how communication failure affects state estimation and what the best
strategy to improve system observability is. There are mainly two methods for
system observability study, one is network topology, and the other is numerical
analysis which is applied in this chapter.
3.3.1 Assumption
We assume that a remote terminal unit (RTU) is attached to each bus. Each
RTU is capable of measuring active power flow in all transmission lines connected
to that bus. An RTU can be either working or failed. A working RTU at bus i
measures active power flow of all transmission lines that connect to bus i. This
information will be sent back to the control center. A failed RTU will not send
any information to the control center. It is assumed that the control center
knows the system’s structure. Bus phase angles measured by PMU devices are
not considered in the case study, but can be included by little adjustment of the
method used in the analysis.
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3.3.2 DC State Estimation
The states to be estimated in DC state estimation are bus phase angles. If the
state estimator can determine all bus phase angles, the system is observable.
Otherwise, the system is unobservable. DC power flow is used for formulating
DC state estimation, z = Hx+e, where x is the vector of bus phase angles to be
estimated. x = (θ1, θ2, ..., θn)
′. z is the active power flow at each transmission
line. We use Pij = Bij × (θi − θj) where Pij : active power flow in transmission
line between bus i and j. Bij : branch susceptance between bus i and j. θi :
phase angle at bus i.
The H matrix is initially set to be a m×n zero matrix, where m =transmission
lines no. + 1. Note that +1 stands for setting bus 1’s angle as reference angle,
H(m, 1) = 1. n = total buses. The ith row of matrix H will present the active
power flow of the ith transmission line. Suppose that the ith transmission line
connects bus j and k, then if at least one of the two RTUs at bus j or k is
functioning, set H(i, j) = Bij , H(i, k) = −Bij .
After formulating the H matrix, rank of H is checked. If rank(H) equals to the
bus number, the system is observable, otherwise the system is unobservable.
3.3.3 Unobservable List
Given that each RTU can be either working or failed, for a n bus system, there
is a total of 2n communication scenarios. These scenarios cover from all RTUs
working to all RTUs failed. If we do a state estimation rank check for all these
25
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scenarios, we can generate a list of scenarios that the system becomes unobserv-
able. We call this list full unobservable list for the n bus system, Un.
For a large system, it is impractical to check all these 2n scenarios. One possible
approximation is to analyze up to a limited number of RTUs failure; for example,
up to 5 RTUs failure. This approximation will be acceptable if the probability
of having more than 5 RTUs failure at the same time is very small. By doing















scenarios. Passing these scenarios to the rank check, we get an unobservable list
which has up to 5 RTUs failure, Un5 . Similarly, we can generate an unobservable
list of up to k RTUs failure, Unk .
3.3.4 Probability of System Becoming Unobservable
If we assign each RTU with a failure probability, we can find the probability
of the system become unobservable. Define pfi i = 1, 2, ..., n as the probability
of RTU at bus i fails. For each scenario in the unobservable list, we can find
its probability of occurring. For example, if the unobservable list contains the
scenario that all RTUs fail, this scenario occurs at a probability of pf1 ×pf2 × ...×
pfn. By adding up all these scenarios in the unobservable list, we can find the
probability of the system becoming unobservable.
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3.3.5 Optimal Upgrade on RTUs
One way to improve the system observability is to upgrade the RTUs. Upgrades
can be done by replacing old communication equipment with new ones. In this
analysis, we assume that an upgrade on RTU will decrease the probability of
RTU failure, thus decrease the probability of the system becomes unobservable.
We should notice that upgrade different combinations of RTUs give different
results. To find which combination of RTUs to upgrade for optimal improvement
on observability, we can do it mathematically or by enumeration. Enumeration
method is given by a flow chart Fig.3.1.
Figure 3.1: Enumeration Method Flow Chart
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Mathematically, the problem can be transformed into a nonlinear optimization
problem. The original probability of RTU failure is defined as pfi . After upgrad-
ing, the probability of RTU failure becomes pfi − δpfi where δpfi is the improve-
ment of reliability as the result of investment. Improvement should be in the
range of 0 < δpfi < p
f
i . If a system operator decides to upgrade m RTUs, the
problem is equivalent to minimize probability of system becoming unobservable.
min(
∑Unk (pf1 −∆1δpf1 )(pf2 −∆2δpf2 )...(pfn−∆nδpfn )) where ∑ni=1 ∆i = m, ∆i = 0
or 1, m is the number of RTU upgrade.
3.4 POWER SYSTEM CONTROL
Another important impact of communication failure is system control. One
advantage of the SCADA system is the replacement of passive automatic load
shedding with intelligent load shedding (ILS). Passive load shedding relies on
under voltage[29] and under frequency[30] relay for load shedding. ILS[31–33]
uses information gathered from RTUs to make decisions. Based on this infor-
mation, the control center can provide more accurate and optimal load shedding
strategy. If the communication channel is congested, the RTUs will not be able
to receive commands of load shedding. This could lead to cascading effect and
loss of load.
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3.4.1 Assumption
In this analysis, we assume that if the communication between the control center
and RTU at bus i failed, then load on bus i cannot be shed, otherwise, any
amount of load can be shed.
3.4.2 Flow chart
Note that load shedding action is only needed when system state changes. In
this analysis, we calculate the loss of load when N-1 contingencies happen. Con-
tingency can be either generator or transmission line failure. The process to
find the optimal loss of load is shown in Fig.3.2. It is a combination of relaxed
DCOPF from research [34] and cascading analysis in blackout research[35]. The
flow chart is capable of simulating the cascading effect by using fast transit part
of OPA method[36, 37], which is widely used in blackout research.




Di − Pi) (3.1)
where Di and Pi stands for demands and injected power at bus i. The DCOP
subject to generator constraints and transmission line constraints.
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Figure 3.2: Flow Chart to Find Optimal Loss of Load
In step 3, the relax the constraints of the generator and transmission line. Add




Di − Pi + wp ×
∑
i,k




where Efij and E
G
i stands for excessive flow and generation respectively. wp is
the penalty for exceed the limit.
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3.5 CASE STUDY
IEEE 14 and 30 bus systems are used as the test system for both analyses in
this case study.
3.5.1 System Observability Test and Upgrade Strategy
The probability of a system becoming unobservable depends on the probability
of communication failure at each substation. In this case study, we assume that
each substation has the same initial probability of communication failure. When
the probability of communication failure at substations increases, the probability
of system becoming unobservable also increases. When pfi = 1 for all i, the
system is surely unobservable.
To improve the probability of system being observable, a system operator needs
to upgrade the RTUs at substations. We assume that each substation has an
initial failure probability of pfi = 0.1 . After the RTU upgrade, the failure
probability drops to 0.01 . We apply enumeration method to determine the
optimal upgrade strategy. Fig.3.3 shows that for the same number of RTUs
upgrade, different combination of RTUs have different results. The gap between
optimal upgrade and least effective upgrade is quite big. The optimal upgrade
strategy is shown in Table 3.1.
For the IEEE 30 bus system, it is unrealistic to list all possible communication
failure scenarios. We then generate an unobservable list resulting from up to
7-RTU failures. If each substation has 0.1 failure probability, we can obtain an
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Figure 3.3: Upgrade IEEE 14 bus system
Table 3.1: IEEE14 bus optimal upgrade n RTU
n Punob Optimal Strategy
0 0.0167 0
1 0.007 7
2 0.0052 2 7
3 0.0034 2 6 7
4 0.0017 2 6 7 9
5 0.0007 2 6 7 8 9
6 0.0005 2 6 7 8 9 13
7 0.00034 2 6 7 8 9 11 13
8 0.00025 2 4 6 7 8 9 11 13
9 0.00016 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 13
10 0.00014 2 4 8 6 7 8 9 10 11 13
initial probability of being unobservable using different unobservable lists. Test
shows that Punb = 0.0287 for U
30
5 , Punb = 0.0372 for U
30
6 , Punb = 0.0420 for U
30
7 .




6 is much smaller than the difference
between up to U306 and U
30
5 . This means that it is acceptable to use U
30
7 . The
optimal upgrade strategy for 30 bus system using U307 is shown in Table 3.2.
Results from IEEE 14 and 30 bus systems show that an upgrade on substation
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Table 3.2: IEEE30 Bus Optimal Upgrade Using U307
Upgrade n buses Punob Optimal Upgrade
0 0.042 0
1 0.0326 25
2 0.023 12 25
3 0.0139 9 12 25
4 0.0099 9 10 12 25
Table 3.3: N-1 contingency on IEEE 14 Bus system
G T full control B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B9 B10 B11 B12 B13 B14 All Lost
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 2.0930 2.0930 2.5900 2.0977 2.0930 2.1011 2.1148 2.0995 2.0956 2.0974 2.1028 2.1038 2.59
2 0 0.1641 0.1819 0.1641 0.1641 0.1641 0.1641 0.1641 0.1641 0.1641 0.1641 0.1641 0.1641 2.59
0 1 0.5313 0.5313 0.5313 0.5313 0.5313 0.5313 0.5320 0.5314 0.5313 0.5313 0.5313 0.5315 2.59
0 2 0.4473 0.4473 0.4473 0.4473 0.4473 0.4473 0.4473 0.4473 0.4473 0.4473 0.4473 0.4473 2.59
0 3-20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
communication equipment will decrease probability of system being unobserv-
able. Note that cost of upgrade on different substations is not considered in the
analysis.
3.5.2 Loss of Load Analysis
The loss of load analysis has been tested on IEEE 14 bus and IEEE 30 bus sys-
tem. An N-1 contingency is applied to both systems. The contingency includes
generator failures and transmission line failures.
Table 3.3 shows loss of load for IEEE 14 bus N-1 contingency analysis when
communication failure happens on different buses. The first and second columns
show the types of contingency, either generator failure or transmission line failure.
G stands for generator, T stands for transmission line. Columns 3 to 15 show
different communication failure scenarios and resulted loss of load. Column 3
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means all communications are working. Column 15 means all communications
failed. Columns 4 to 14 represent only one bus communication failed.
The first test case in the first row shows that when there is no contingency,
the system will have no loss of load, regardless of communication system status.
This result is reasonable because when there is no contingency, the system does
not need to change its configuration. The second and the third test cases show
that when generator one or two fails, loss of load will inevitably occur. Since
generator one is the main generator in the system, loss of this generator will
incur higher loss of load. Compared with generator one, generator two has a
smaller capacity, thus its failure will incur less loss of load. For a transmission
line failure contingency, only line one and two failures will cause loss of load.
This is because transmission lines one and two are the two major transmission
lines, when other transmission line fails, energy can flow through the neighboring
lines.
The test case also shows that for the same contingency, different communication
failure scenarios will cause different amount of loss of load. If a communication
failure happens on the bus that requires load shedding for optimal operation
strategy, an increase of loss of load will happen. For example, in the generator
two failure case, only when communication on bus two failure will incur a higher
loss of load. This is because when generator two fails, the optimal load shedding
is to shed load on bus two. Sometimes optimal load shedding requires shed-
ding load on several buses, like generator one failure case, then all these buses’
communication need to be protected for optimal load shedding.
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For test case two to five, when all communications are lost, the system will lose all
its loads. This is caused by the cascading effects. When all communications are
lost, the system cannot shed any load which leads to an overload of transmission
lines or generators. If a generator is overloaded, because no load can be shed,
the generator will automatically disconnect from the grid. If transmission line
are overloaded, overload relay will open the transmission line, thus causing more
lines to be overloaded. The same analysis was applied on IEEE 30 bus where
results show same conclusion.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we studied at how communication failure affects power system
in monitoring and control. For monitoring function, we found that a communi-
cation failure could cause the system to be unobservable. Additionally, certain
substations are more important than others for system observability. To improve
system observability, this chapter provides suggestions on how to optimally up-
grade communication equipment on substations. For power system control, we
found that a communication failure could cause extra loss of load. Communica-
tion failures cause cascading effects which lead to unnecessary loss of load. By
protecting certain substations, the system will experience less loss of load.
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Short-term and very short-term load forecasting are essential for power grid
management operations such as automatic generation control, unit commitment
scheduling, and transmission loss estimation. Most existing forecasting tech-
niques require that the load data be available up to the current time step. In
recent years, cyber attacks increasingly threaten the secure operation of power
grids. One potential cyber threat is communication failure which will affect
load forecasting. When communication failure happens and actual load data are
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not available, forecasting accuracy suffers. To overcome this problem, we pro-
pose a time-forward kriging based approach to forecast load with and without
communication failure. This technique has the ability to forecast the load by
utilizing load information from neighboring regions. The proposed method has
been tested using NYISO and PJM load data with five minute and one hour
intervals respectively. Our results show that the proposed method is capable
of forecasting load under communication failure with acceptable accuracy and
improved accuracy when compared with other forecasting techniques.
4.2 Introduction
Load forecasting is an important process in power systems operation. Based on
the forecasting time scale, load forecasting can be categorized into long-term,
short-term and very short-term. Long-term load forecasting, for example year-
ahead load forecasting, is used for development planning. Short-term load fore-
casting which refers to day-ahead or hour-ahead load forecasting is generally
used for unit commitment, transmission loss prediction, and other scheduling
related activities. For unit commitment, an accurate demand forecast can help
system operators determine unit commitment schedules more efficiently and eco-
nomically [38]. Short-term load forecasting is also used to predict active power
losses in the transmission systems, thus system operators can cater for energy
losses more precisely [39]. Very short-term load forecasting has a time scale
of a few minutes. One application of very-short term load forecasting is dy-
namic state estimation (DSE) which combines load forecasting techniques with
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extended Kalman filters to estimate system states more accurately [40]. Very-
short term load forecasting is also used in automatic generation control (AGC).
Reference [41] uses slow and fast Kalman estimators to forecast system load
and thus improves the performance of AGC. Our analysis is focused on load
forecasting for short-term and very short-term time scales.
State-of-the-art load forecasting techniques can be categorized into artificial-
intelligence based forecasting and statistical forecasting methods [42]. Artificial-
intelligence based forecasting methods such as artificial neural networks (ANN)
have been shown in many papers to accomplish various forecasting goals effi-
ciently with the help of parallel computing. Reference [43] shows the ability to
accurately identify various long term trends in load data using ANN. Reference
[44] combines the ANN method with ensemble weather prediction to forecast
load. Statistical forecasting methods such as autoregressive integrated mov-
ing average (ARIMA) models are also shown to perform well in load forecast-
ing. References [45–47] demonstrate good forecasting results for daily, hourly
and intra-hourly time horizons respectively. Reference [48] compares a number
of short-term forecasting techniques, include ARIMA, periodic Autoregressive,
Holt-Winters exponential smoothing, and principal component analysis. The
main drawback of these forecasting techniques is that they all require load in-
formation from the last few time steps for accurate prediction and they assume
that load data are always available.
The load data used for forecasting is gathered from supervisory control and data
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acquisition (SCADA) systems, which collect electric power grid data such as ac-
tive, reactive power and equipment status from remote terminal units (RTUs) to
the control center. These RTUs can be geographically far apart. Communication
links between the RTUs and the control center are established in different forms,
including satellite, optical fiber, telephone, microwave, and others [3]. These
communication links are not 100% reliable due to unintentional or intentional
causes. The unintentional causes include aging of communication equipment,
malfunction of communication equipment and faulty operations. The intentional
causes are predominately cyber attacks.
In recent years, several researchers have discussed the possibility of cyber attack
on power systems [11–13]. According to [14], cyber attacks can be classified into
three categories; data integrity, privacy, and data availability. Data integrity
attack refers to unauthorized manipulation of measurement or control data.
Privacy attack is related to business and personal information leakage. Data
availability attack refers to blocking the communication channels thus causing
communication failure. According to [10], distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attack is a common data availability attack on communication networks. DDoS
attack is easy to implement but difficult to counter [24].
Communication failure is a serious threat to the secure and reliable operation
of the power grids [1]. An analysis of blackout history shows that although
large blackout incidents are mostly not initiated by communication failure, their
spread, however, are mostly linked to communication problems [9]. The blackout
on August 14, 2003 in north America, for example, was caused by lack of situation
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awareness in the control room [26]. Existing load forecasting techniques reach
their limitations when communication failure and continuous data loss occur.
This is because current forecasting techniques depend on the autocorrelation
with data from the few most recent steps. These forecasting techniques are
not designed to handle the situation where new load measurements are not fed
to the system. Forecasting errors will be accumulated when systems are under
communication failure. It is thus necessary to consider how to forecast load when
communication failure occurs.
This chapter proposes a time-forward Kriging technique to overcome the chal-
lenge of communication failure on load data and address the limitations of exist-
ing forecasting techniques in handling communication failure. Kriging is a well
known geostatistics technique [49] that has been applied in various disciplines,
including solar irradiance forecasting [50], mining [51], signal processing [52], en-
vironmental science [53], wind forecast [49], etc. The main contribution of this
chapter is to propose a prediction technique that can still offer acceptable load
forecasting accuracy under power system communication failure.
The remaining parts of this chapter are arranged as follows. Section 4.3 ex-
plains the general formulation and application context of time-forward kriging.
Section 4.4 discusses how to prepare load data for time-forward kriging under dif-
ferent communication scenarios. Section 4.5 shows test results for the proposed
approach. Conclusions are drawn in Section 4.6.
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4.3 Time-Forward Kriging
This section discusses the formulation of the kriging method which is a spatial
temporal process that operates by finding the correlation/covariance among vari-
ous time series. The time series can be from different locations (cross-correlation)
or two series from the same location but having a time lag between them (auto-
correlation).
4.3.1 Assumptions
The kriging method is developed based on the following assumptions:
• Spatial-temporal processes have a known correlation/covariance [49].
• The time series under consideration are second order stationary (constant
mean and variance) [49].
• The spatial observations are isotropic (invariant under rotation) and sta-
tionary (invariant under translation) [54, 55].
The first assumption is necessary because kriging utilizes the estimated correla-
tion or covariance structures to define the relationship of the spatial-temporal
quantities. It defines how a quantity (in this case, the system load) changes
according to given changes in space and time. In geostatistical approaches, the
parametric covariance models rely on assumptions such as stationarity, seper-
abilty and fully symmetry [49]. The covariance matrix depends on the spatial
distances and temporal lag with different fitting models. In the load forecasting
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case, electricity demands for a region are aggregated as one time series. Due to
the fact that this aggregated data lacks clearly defined physical distance, empir-
ical kriging is used.
In the empirical kriging approach, a covariance structure is constructed from
historical data (by calculating the sample covariance) rather than using a fitted
covariance function. We note that in geostatistics, a spatial variogram is always
involved in kriging due to lack of temporal data. However according to [49],
empirical kriging outperforms most other kriging models given long enough his-
torical data for fitting. Another reason why empirical kriging is suitable for load
forecasting is that load data contains reasonable correlation since inter-region
loads have similar load patterns. This is due to the fact that electric load is
weather-dependent. An increase of load at one region is probably due to hot or
cold weather, which also increases of load at neighboring regions.
The second assumption, loosely defined as true stationarity, implies consistency
in all order statistics. However, strict stationarity is difficult to achieve. There-
fore in this chapter, only second order stationarity is considered. Stationarity
can be achieved by detrending the load series. The detrended load series have a
constant mean and variance. This means that the load data must be detrended
first before kriging method can be applied.
The last assumption is that the load data exhibit isotropy and stationarity.
Isotropy in this context implies a rotationally invariant random field while sta-
tionarity indicates translational invariance. These two properties are usually
considered during covariance function fitting for predictive analyses at arbitrary
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locations. However, in load forecasting, we do not need to forecast load at any
arbitrary location, thus covariance functions are not used. Empirical kriging is
used in this chapter; it calculates the covariance structures using historical data,
so covariance functions are not required. Therefore, the isotropy assumption is
not relevant in this load forecasting analysis.
If these assumptions are met, time-forward kriging has advantages for handling
load forecasting during communication failure. When multiple load time series
from the same power network are presented, correlation/covariance is assumed
among various time series. When one or more time series are unavailable due
to communication failure, the load data from the unavailable region can still be
forecast by utilizing the load data from the remaining regions.
4.3.2 Covariance Matrix Formulation
Time-forward kriging is used in this chapter to assess the forecasting ability of
spatial-temporal structures. Kriging is used to estimate the weights of observed
values z (from M temporal lags and N spatial points) using the covariance
structures, which are derived below. At each spatial location, the time-forward
kriging point estimate zˆ(s, t) is thus given by:
zˆ(s, t) = c′0C
−1
z (4.1)
where C is the spatial-temporal variance-covariance matrix, c′0C
−1 is the weight
vector, and z is the vector with the observed value from the past M steps from
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N locations. C ∈ RNM×NM , where N is the number of spatial locations and M
is the maximum time lag under consideration:
C =

C0 C1 · · · CM−1





CM−1 CM−2 · · · C0

, ∈ RNM×NM (4.2)
Cτ represents the spatial sub-covariance matrix at time lag τ ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,M−1}:
Cτ =

C11,τ C12,τ · · · C1N,τ





CN1,τ CN2,τ · · · CNN,τ

, ∈ RN×N (4.3)
where Cij,τ = cov{Z(si, t), Z(sj , t− τ)}.
Similar to C, c0 is given by:
c0 =
(
c0,1 c0,2 · · · c0,M
)′




ci1,τ ci2,τ · · · ciN,τ
)
, ∈ R1×N (4.5)
where τ ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, cij,τ = cov{Z(si, t), Z(sj , t − τ)}, i is the index of fore-
casting region. The arrangement of z must agree with the arrangement of c0.
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The variance-covariance matrix construction for kriging under communication
failure will be further illustrated in the following section.
4.4 Application of Kriging on Load Forecasting
4.4.1 Load data preparation
In order to apply time-forward kriging to load data, the load time series must
satisfy the stationarity assumption. We achieve this by removing known trends in
a process known as detrending. Load data have two significant trend components,
namely, seasonal (yearly) trend, and weekly trend. The seasonal trend is usually
a yearly variation caused by different user patterns during the various seasons
with the electricity consumption depending on the weather conditions. The
weekly trend is governed by the fact that loads during the week days are different
from the loads during the weekends. Note that other factors such as public
holidays can also affect the electricity demand but are not considered in this
chapter.
Seasonal load trends can be removed by fitting linear polynomial regression lines
to every individual region using load time series from the previous year. Poly-
nomial regression describes the relationship between the independent variable x
(time index) and the dependent variable y (load) using an nth order polynomial
(n = 10 in this chapter). For example, y = a0 + a1x + a2x
2 + · · · + anxn + ε.
The seasonal trend components are additive. The assumption made here is that
the year-to-year load trend variation is small. Similar to the seasonal trend,
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weekly trend is also additive. To further remove the weekly trend, an iterative
procedure is adopted. The weekly trend is fitted using three months’ data prior
to the forecasting month by finding the weekly average in these three months.
For each region, the average value of the same day of the week and same time of
the day is used as the weekly trend. This fitted weekly trend will be deducted
from the data of the fourth month (forecasting month). Once both seasonal and
weekly trends are removed, kriging is performed during the fourth month. The
procedure is repeated for the whole year. For example, load data from January,
February and March are used to train and forecast the load in April. For the fol-
lowing month of May, load data from February, March and April are used in the
forecasting model. A flowchart describing the process of kriging load forecasting









Figure 4.1: Kriging flowchart
After detrending the data, the residual time series are stationary. This chapter
investigates two cases of forecasting, namely, kriging without communication
failure and kriging under communication failure. The main difference between
the two is that when communication failure occurs, parts of the input data to
feed the forecasting model will be lost.
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4.4.2 Sample Load Data
Two publicly accessible data sets are used in this chapter. The first data set
is five minute interval load data from New York Independent System Operator
(NYISO) from 2011, 2012 and 2013. There are 11 regions (11 time series) in
NYISO, as shown in Fig. 4.2. NYISO Load data are available at http://www.
nyiso.com. The second data set is hourly load from PJM Interconnection LLC’s
(PJM) from 2012 and 2013. PJM data consist of nine regions and are available
at http://www.pjm.com. PJM is a regional transmission organization which is






















































































Figure 4.2: NYISO map of 11 electric power grid regions in New York State
USA.
The original data sets have seasonal and weekly trends. Fig. 4.3 shows the
seasonal trend property of the NYISO region number nine (N.Y.C.). The dark
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Figure 4.3: Seasonal load patter in year 2011 and 2012 at N.Y.C. Load units
are in MW.
gray curve is the actual load of N.Y.C in 2012. The black curve is the season
trend fitted from year 2011. The light gray curve is the seasonal detrended
load, which equals to the dark gay curve minus the black cruve. We select
N.Y.C as an example to show that the season trend from 2011 is similar to 2012.
One exception is region 10 (NORTH) which has around 20% higher load during
January and February in 2012 than 2011.
Fig. 4.4 shows the weekly trend property of N.Y.C load data after the seasonal
detrending. In this 3D scatter plot, the x-axis is the day of the week, the y-axis
is time of day, and the z-axis is the seasonal detrended load. From Fig. 4.4, we
can see the strong weekly trend. These weekly trends are similar among each
region which helps the performance of kriging load forecasting.
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Figure 4.4: Weekly load pattern of January 2012 at N.Y.C. after seasonal
trend removed. Load units are in MW.
Table 4.1: NYISO load forecasting average nRMSE percentage error in different scenarios (2012 & 2013)
CAPITL CENTRL DUNWOD GENESE HUD VL LONGIL MHK VL MILLWD N.Y.C. NORTH WEST Average
S1 0.81 1.19 1.62 0.56 1.37 0.52 0.95 3.58 0.35 1.49 0.77 1.20
S2 0.96 1.28 1.88 0.70 1.60 0.69 1.07 4.10 0.52 1.52 0.89 1.38
S3 0.81 1.19 1.60 0.56 1.35 0.51 0.95 3.52 0.35 1.57 0.77 1.20
S4 3.98 2.02 2.99 2.16 2.64 2.78 2.93 5.67 2.26 2.95 2.32 2.97
S5 10.34 9.05 13.36 10.88 12.83 14.69 9.97 15.75 9.99 6.41 8.39 11.06
S1: Kriging with no communication failure S2: Persistence model S3: VAR(3) model S4: Kriging under single communication failure S5: Use trend data
only with communication failure
Table 4.2: PJM load forecasting average nRMSE percentage error in different scenarios (2013)
PJME PJMW COMED DAYTON AEP DUQ DOM FE DEOK Average
S1 3.77 3.36 4.04 3.77 2.99 3.36 4.05 3.41 3.68 3.60
S2 5.21 4.68 5.47 5.31 4.32 4.58 5.47 4.68 5.07 4.98
S3 3.97 3.34 4.28 3.80 3.01 3.67 4.11 3.55 3.80 3.73
S4 5.67 4.40 8.16 4.39 3.82 5.17 6.49 4.46 4.78 5.26
S5 14.22 12.56 16.85 14.46 11.76 12.68 15.96 12.53 14.94 14.00
S1: Kriging with no communication failure S2: Persistence model S3: VAR(3) model S4: Kriging under
single communication failure S5: Use trend data only with communication failure
4.4.2.1 Kriging Without Communication Failure
In the full communication scenario, load data from all regions is available. After
checking the cross correlation, it is found that detrended load datasets have high
correlation coefficients. Empirically we find that an increase of temporal order,
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M , marginally improves the forecasting accuracy with a tradeoff in computation
time. In this chapter, we choose M = 3 in (4.2).
Since data from all the regions are available, for the NYISO 11 regions case,
N = 11 in (4.3). Thus the dimensions of the previous matrices are Cτ ∈ R11×11,
C ∈ R33×33, c0 ∈ R33×1.
For example, to forecast load at a particular region in April, data from January
to March of all the 11 regions are used to construct C and c0. z in (4.1) is a
vector that contains 33 measurements from the past three steps of the 11 regions.
4.4.2.2 Kriging under Communication Failure
Compared with the previous situation, the main difference with kriging under
communication failure is that the load data from the failure regions is not avail-
able for constructing the measurement vector z. To perform load forecasting in
this scenario, the covariance matrix in (4.2) uses only the data from the avail-
able regions. Meanwhile, c0 is built based on the covariance of the forecasting
region and the available regions. If single region communication failure occurs
at NYISO, to forecast the load at that region, the dimensions of the matrices
are Cτ ∈ R10×10, C ∈ R30×30, c0 ∈ R30×1.
For example, when data from one NYISO region is not available, to forecast load
at this region, load data from the 10 neighboring regions is used to construct C.
However, load data from all 11 regions is used to construcut c0 in (4.5). z in
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(4.1) is a vector that contains 30 measurements of the last three steps from the
remaining 10 regions.
4.5 Results and Discussion
The performance of Kriging-based load forecasting method is shown in this sec-
tion for two cases; with and without communication failure. The performance










where Ft and At are the forecast and actual values at time t respectively. By
dividing the RMSE with its respective mean, nRMSE can meaningfully compare
different data sets.
As discussed in section 4.4, our analysis covers two scenarios; kriging without
communication failure and kriging under communication failure. In order to
illustrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach, we chose three common
forecasting models as benchmarking models to the two communication scenarios.
The persistence model is the first benchmarking model used in the case of no
communication failure. This forecasting model assumes that the forecast of each
time step is the same as the value from the previous time step. It is the sim-
plest forecasting model used in the literature especially for a very short term
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forecasting under the assumption that the dynamics of the system do not vary
too much within such a short time. As the persistence model is quite simple
and requires no parameter tuning, its performance would not be as comparable
to other commonly used forecasting models such as artificial-intelligence based
models like ANN or statistical forecasting methods like ARIMA. ANN models
require fine-tuning multiple forecasting parameters which will affect the forecast-
ing accuracy significantly and thus it is difficult to impose objective constraints
to benchmark with the kriging approach. As for time series models like ARIMA,
it only uses data from the forecasting region while kriging uses data from both
forecasting region and neighboring regions. Therefore, in our analysis ANN or
ARIMA may not be suitable benchmark for the kriging method.
The second benchmarking model used in the case of no communication failure
is called vector autoregressive model (VAR). VAR is quite similar to ARIMA
in that it uses the time series data to forecast. The main difference is that
VAR is a multivariate autoregressive model, which uses the past data from both
the forecasting station and the neighboring stations. A VAR(p) model uses
measurements from all the stations from the latest p time steps (a total of p×N
values are used). We use the VAR(3) model to benchmark our empirical kriging
results, similar to the case of M = 3 in the kriging model. The input data
for forecasting is the same for both VAR(3) and kriging. By using the VAR
model, we can apply the same detrending method and use the same input data
for forecasting. The covariance matrix for kriging and the parameters for VAR
are both updated monthly. Therefore, under no communication failure, VAR(3)
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will be a fair comparison to kriging. VAR has been used in load forecasting with
good results [56]. For more details on VAR forecasting, please refer to [57].
The last benchmarking model is for the case of communication failure. The
VAR model is not a suitable benchmarking model in this case because it cannot
forecast load when communication failure occurs and the load data from the
forecasting region are not available. The third benchmark is simply derived
from the overall trend which is the sum of seasonal trend and weekly trends.
4.5.1 Kriging Without Communication Failure
For each region, time-forward kriging is performed iteratively from April to De-
cember (2012 and 2013 for NYISO, 2013 for PJM). Forecasting error results for
NYISO and PJM are shown in the first row (S1) of TABLE 4.1 and TABLE 4.2.
The average nRMSE of kriging model for NYISO and PJM are 1.20% and 3.60%
respectively. Forecasting errors for PJM are higher than NYISO because the
effective ramp rates of load data from PJM are larger than those from NYISO.
The persistence model results are displayed in the second row of TABLE 4.1 and
TABLE 4.2. The persistence model yields an average nRMSE of 1.38% and 4.98%
for NYISO and PJM respectively. Similar to the results from kriging technique,
the errors in PJM are higher than NYISO due to its larger measurement time
interval.
The VAR(3) model results are displayed in the third row of TABLE 4.1 and
TABLE 4.2. The average nRMSE percentage errors are 1.20% and 3.73%.
53
Chapter 4. Spatial Load Forecasting Under Communication Failure
It can be seen from TABLE 4.1 and TABLE 4.2 that the time-forward kriging
technique and VAR(3) outperform the persistence model in all data series. The
forecasting performance of kriging and VAR(3) is similar, although in the absence
of communication failure kriging outperforms VAR for the PJM data.
4.5.2 Kriging under Communication Failure
This section analyzes the performance of kriging based forecasting under com-
munication failure. We simulate communication failure sustained for a month at
a single region. For example we first assume that the load measurements from
one region are unavailable for the entire month of April. Although sustained
communication failure lasting one month is not likely to happen, the analysis
is performed to show the ability of forecasting load without data from a single
region for a significant period. Under this scenario, only the data from the re-
maining regions is used to forecast the load of that region in April. This approach
is then applied iteratively for each region, and also for all subsequent months,
and the results for NYISO (2012 and 2013) and PJM (2013) are shown in the
fourth row (S4) of TABLE 4.1 and TABLE 4.2. i.e. each column represents one
communication failure scenario, thus a total of 11 and 9 scenarios are tested for
NYISO and PJM respectively. The average forecasting errors for scenarios with
single region communication failure are 2.97% for NYISO and 5.26% for PJM.
Since few existing methods can forecast load without all prior time series, we
compare the kriging method with trend data, which is calculated using the sum
of seasonal and weekly trends. These trend data are predetermined and hence
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can be used for forecasting without using the latest measurements. Errors for
trend data are shown in the fifth row (S5) of TABLE 4.1 and TABLE 4.2. The
trend data has an average error of 11.06% and 14.00% for NYISO and PJM re-
spectively. Comparing kriging with trend forecasts, kriging exhibits significantly
better performance. We further note that the first and fourth entries in the
tables show that single region failure forecasts, while a factor of two worse than
those without data failure, are still acceptable.
4.5.3 Discussion
Our analysis has focused on one-step ahead kriging with no communication fail-
ure and single station sustained communication failure. To understand the per-
formance of time-forward kriging with multiple-step forecasting and under other
possible communication failure scenarios, further analyses of multiple-step, fail-
ure duration, failure time of the day, and multiple-station failure, are applied to
the test systems.
4.5.3.1 Multiple-step ahead forecasting
Multiple-step ahead forecasting is useful when the operator requires forecasting
load for the future with a larger time gap. To perform multiple-step ahead
forecasting, two approaches are proposed. The first approach is to increase the
value of τ in (4.4) and (4.5). For example, to forecast two steps ahead, τ ∈
{2, · · · ,M + 1}, to forecast q steps ahead, τ ∈ {q, · · · ,M + q − 1}. The second
approach keeps the original kriging formulation but changes the sample rate. For
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example, NYISO original data are 5 minutes interval. To forecast 2 steps ahead
(10 minutes ahead), we resample the original data to 10 minutes intervals. After
the resampling, we can use the same one step ahead kriging to forecast load 10
minutes ahead.
These two approaches have been tested on NYISO data of year 2012 and 2013.
TABLE 4.3 summaries the multiple-step forecasting nRMSE percentage error
with full communication. From TABLE 4.3, we can see that forecasting errors
for these two approaches are very similar. For some cases, the second approach
slightly outperforms the first approach. This result is expected because the
second approach uses data with a longer time span. For example, to forecast
20 minutes ahead, the first approach uses three measurements from the last 15
minutes with five minutes interval. To perform the same forecasting, the second
approach uses three measurements from the last hour with 20 minutes interval.
Although the second approach outperforms the first approach in some cases, the
first approach can forecast load with arbitrary steps ahead. For example, the
second approach has difficulty forecasting load 5 steps (25 minutes ahead) ahead.
The first approach can easily forecast 5 steps ahead.
Table 4.3: NYISO average multiple-step forecasting nRMSE percentage error
with full communication
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4.5.3.2 Communication failure duration
Communication failures can last for a short period or a very long period, de-
pending on the severity of cyber attack or equipment malfunction. By looking
at the mechanics of the kriging method, we find that the duration of commu-
nication failure will not affect the kriging method result. This is due to two
reasons. The first reason is that the kriging covariance matrix is calculated once
per month. The other reason is that only data from other locations are used for
forecasting. No matter if there is a five minutes communication failure or five
hours communication failure, the forecasting result will be the same.
4.5.3.3 Failure time of the day
Communication failures can happen at random times during the day. One nat-
ural question is how the forecasting error varies at different time of the day. To
answer this question, further tests are performed. Fig. 4.5 shows the average
forecasting errors of one NYISO region (CAPITL) at different times and days.
The gray curves are the average absolute forecasting errors. Absolute error is
used to prevent cancellation of over-estimation and under-estimation of errors.
The black curves are the year 2012 average actual load of region CAPITL at
different days. Fig 4.5 shows that the forecasting error is relatively low, around
50 MW (at a load of 1200–1600 MW), for all days at all time when load read-
ing from CAPITL are not available. There is no significant correlation between
forecasting error and load. Similar phenomena exist in other regions of both
test systems. This is a reasonable result because the original load data have
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Figure 4.5: NYISO region ‘CAPITL’ average load forecasting errors under
communication failure. Load units are in MW.
been detrended seasonally and weekly prior to applying the kriging method: the
detrended data has no seasonal or weekly trend. This consistent performance is
another advantage of using the kriging method.
4.5.3.4 Multiple-station communication failure
Previously the analyses for communication failure were only performed for sin-
gle station communication failure. Even though simultaneous multiple-station
communication failure is unlikely, the time-forward kriging can handle such sce-
narios. Fig. 4.6 and Fig. 4.7 show how multiple-station communication failures
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affect kriging forecasting errors for one NYISO region (CAPITL) and one PJM
region (PJME). For each data set, we select one region to represent the per-
formance of kriging under multiple-station communication failure. The other
regions have similar performance. In Fig. 4.6 and Fig. 4.7, the x-axis represents
the number of stations with communication failure. The lowest x-axis number
represents that the region itself fails. The maximum number is 10 for NYISO,
since apart from the forecasting region, there are another 10 regions. Of these
remaining 10 regions, at least one region’s communication must keep working to
perform the kriging method. The ‘o’ dots at each x value represent average fore-
casting errors for different communication scenarios. For example, in NYISO,





‘o’ dots. The ‘+’ dots repre-
sent the forecasting errors of trend data, which are not affected by the number
of stations with communication failure: a clearly unrealistic result.
Fig. 4.6 and Fig. 4.7 show a general trend of increasing forecasting error when the
number of failure regions increases. But the kriging techniques have a smaller
forecasting error than trend data given any amount of communication failure.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, a new time-forward kriging based approach is proposed to fore-
cast load under different power system communication scenarios, including fully
operational systems and those with multiple failures. The proposed approach
has been tested on NYISO five minute (very short-term) and PJM hourly (short
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Figure 4.6: NYISO region ‘CAPITL’ average nRMSE forecasting error at
difference communication failure scenarios (number of regions under commu-
nication failure)


















Figure 4.7: PJM region ‘PJME’ average nRMSE forecasting error at differ-
ence communication failure scenarios (number of regions under communication
failure)
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term) load data for the years 2012 and 2013. These case studies show that by
utilizing the correlation among load data from different regions, our proposed
approach can forecast load, both short term and very short-term, under differ-
ent communication failure scenarios with reasonable accuracy. Our case studies
also show that the performance of the proposed time-forward kriging approach
is not affected by the communication failure time of occurrence or duration.
Comparing the test result of NYISO and PJM systems, we also show that, at






Using Kriging Based Bus Load
Forecasting
5.1 Overview
Dynamic state estimation (DSE) in power system combines forecasting technique
with measurement data to accurately estimate system state. The current DSE
techniques cannot handle the situation where communication failure occurs and
measurement data are lost. In this chapter, a new approach is proposed to
address this problem. The proposed approach combines the Extended Kalman
62
Chapter 5. Dynamic State Estimation Under Communication Failure
Filter (EKF) with load forecasting technique that predicts missing measurement
data. A time-forward kriging model is used to forecast the missing load data
from the available measurement data. The forecast load is then converted to
forecast system state through power flow analysis. The Extended Kalman Filter
is used to combine the measurement data with the forecast state to obtain a more
accurate filtered state. The proposed approach is tested on IEEE 14 bus system
and IEEE 118 bus system using realistic load pattern from NYISO and PJM
with various scenarios of measurement error and communication failure. The test
results from the proposed approach are compared with traditional weighted least
square (WLS) state estimation and DSE with multi-step ahead autoregressive
integrated moving average (ARIMA) load forecasting. From the case studies,
we find that the proposed approach provides more accurate and faster state
estimation under most scenarios.
5.2 Introduction
State estimation in power system estimates system states (phase angles & bus
voltage magnitudes) based on the measurement data gathered from supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. The measurement data needed in
state estimation include real and reactive load at substations, transmission line
power flow, generator real power output, generator voltage magnitude, circuit
breakers status, etc. These measurement data may contain random measurement
errors due to the inaccuracy of the metering devices. Thus these measurement
data are not 100% accurate [4]. Besides, certain data of the grid such as bus
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phase angle cannot be measured traditionally. In recent years, newly developed
phasor measurement unit (PMU) can measure bus phase angle using GPS signal
[58], but PMU has not been widely deployed. Due to the measurement incom-
pleteness and random measurement error of SCADA system, state estimation is
still the primary function in power system energy management system (EMS).
Other functions in EMS, such as contingency analysis, generation planning, eco-
nomic dispatch, all rely on the results from the state estimation [3]. Accurately
estimating system state is crucial to the reliable operation of electric power sys-
tems.
State estimation uses measurement data gathered from remote terminal units
(RTUs). These RTUs can be geographically far apart. The communication
links between the RTUs and the control center have different forms, including
telephone, optical fiber, satellite, microwaves, etc. These communication links
are not 100% reliable and may be prone to malicious attacks. Communication
failures can be caused by unintentional and intentional reasons. Unintentional
communication failures include malfunctioning of equipment, human error, inad-
equate communication architecture, etc. Most of the power outages are reported
to be related to communication errors [9]. For example, the 2003 North Amer-
ican blackout was linked to a computer failure that disabled the alarm system
in the control center [26]. Intentional communication failures can be caused by
cyber attacks. In recent years, researchers have been discussing the possibil-
ity of cyber attacks on power systems [12]. One type of these cyber attacks is
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack which will block the communication
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links [24, 59]. Under unintentional or intentional communication failures, the
control center cannot receive measurement data from certain RTUs. When mul-
tiple measurement data are unavailable, the existing state estimation techniques
may not be able to estimate the system state accurately.
Traditional WLS state estimation uses instantaneous measurement data to esti-
mate the system state. For example, to estimate the system state at time step
k, only the measurement data from the time step k is used. This approach can
provide a reasonably accurate state estimation when the current measurement
data are not delayed or lost. When the system experiences some kind of com-
munication failures, the performance of the WLS state estimation deteriorates.
The system may even become unobservable and the control center will have no
knowledge of certain parts of the grid. Another limitation of the WLS state
estimation is that it cannot forecast the system state for the next time step.
Dynamics state estimation in power system was developed to forecast the system
state for the next time step and to estimate the system state of the current time
step more accurately. The benefit of forecasting system state ahead of time
is that it gives system operators more time to prepare and react to potential
emergency. More details on DSE will be discussed in section 5.3. It should be
noted that the existing DSE methods cannot handle situations where there is
a sustained communication failure and the measurement data are not available.
In this chapter, we propose a new DSE approach which combines the time-
forward kriging based load forecasting technique with the Extended Kalman
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Figure 5.1: Time line of the proposed flow. Dotted sample delayed, dashed
sample in time
Filter (EKF). The proposed DSE approach can predict and estimate system
state even with partial communication failures.
The remaining parts of the chapter are organized as follows. Section 5.3 explains
the background of DSE and EKF. Section 5.4 presents the formulation of DSE
with kriging based load forecasting technique. Section 5.5 explains how to build
the test system and set the model parameters. Section 5.6 shows the test results
for different communication failure scenarios. Conclusion is drawn in Section
5.7.
5.3 Background
5.3.1 Dynamics State Estimation
Several survey papers [60, 61] provide an overview of the power system dynamics
state estimation. Dynamics state estimation is distinct from static state estima-
tion, which uses single time step measurement data to estimate the system state
of the current time step. The static state estimation lacks the ability to forecast
system state for the next time step.
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Dynamic state estimation was first developed in 1970s to track the dynamics of
power system state and to accurately estimate system state [62]. At the early
stage of DSE development, the system state transition modeling was very sim-
ple (similar to random walk process), thus there was no real predictive ability.
Reference [63] improves the DSE by using exponential smoothing technique and
Kalman filter to forecast and filter the system state. The forecasting ability of
DSE gives system operator more time to prepare and react to potential emer-
gency.
Generally, there are two main steps in dynamic state estimation; state forecasting
and state filtering. The state forecasting step tracks the dynamics of system state
and predict the one step ahead system state. Various forecasting methods and
approaches have been used in the literatures, such as exponential smoothing [63]
and artificial neural network (ANN) [40]. The state filtering step combines the
forecast state with measurement data to find an optimal filtered state.
The majority of DSE used in the power system are based on the Extended
Kalman Filter. There are several variation of the EKF in the literature, such as
unscented Kalman filter [64]. In this chapter, our proposed approach is based
on the EKF.
5.3.2 Extended Kalman Filter
Extended Kalman Filter is generally used to estimate nonlinear system state. It
has been widely used in engineering applications such as power system dynamic
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state estimation, navigation system and GPS. There are two main steps in EKF;
state forecasting and state filtering.
5.3.2.1 State Forecasting
In the state forecasting step, system state for the next time step is forecast using
the following equations.
x˜k = Fk−1xˆk−1 + gk−1 (5.1)
Mk = Fk−1Σk−1F
′
k−1 + Qk−1 (5.2)
where
x˜k Forecast state vector at time k
xˆk−1 Estimated state vector at time k − 1
Fk−1 State transition matrix at time k − 1
gk−1 Associated with trend behavior at time k − 1
Σk−1 Estimation error covariance matrix at time k − 1
Mk Forecast state error covariance matrix at time k
Qk−1 Noise covariance matrix at time k
The values of Fk−1 and gk−1 are estimated based on the forecasting techniques.
The widely used system state forecasting techniques include exponential smooth-
ing and artificial neural network [60].
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To predict the system state for the next time step, there are two approaches
in the literatures. One approach is to use the system state (phase angles &
voltage magnitudes) as the forecasting variable [65]. Another approach is to use
the bus load (active/reactive load) as the forecasting variable[40, 66]. The first
approach forecast system state directly by using the previous system state. This
approach is simpler and more straightforward. The forecast system state can
be directly applied to (5.1). However, forecasting system state directly lacks
physical meaning. This will affect the forecasting accuracy.
The second approach forecast the bus load. After the load forecasting, system
operators calculate the generations that are needed to supply the forecast load.
Once the forecast load and the forecast generations are available, system opera-
tors can calculate the forecast system state through power flow analysis. System
configuration information, such as circuit breaker status, should be gathered
separately and updated in the power flow analysis.
Compared with the first approach, the second approach is more complicated.
However, it has the following benefits. The first benefit is that system load has
a clear pattern. Thus load forecasting can be very accurate [66, 67]. The second
benefit is that load is independent of system structure and it drives the change
of system state. Forecasting system state directly faces difficulty when there is
a system reconfiguration, such as status change of circuit breakers. Since load
is independent from system structure, the system reconfiguration will not affect
our load forecasting process. The system reconfiguration information will be
used in the power flow analysis that converts forecast load to forecast state.
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When using the bus load as the forecasting variable, the state transition matrix,
Fk−1, is not calculated during the forecasting process. Equation (5.1) is not
used. The forecast state is converted from the forecast load. Thus the Mk in
(5.2) cannot be updated and should be estimated prior to applying the following
filtering step.
5.3.2.2 State Filtering
The state filtering step in the EKF calculates the optimal system state by com-
bining the forecast state with the measurement data.
The optimal filtered system state minimizes the combined error in the objective
function shown in (5.3). R is the diagonal error variance matrix of the measure-
ment. The value of R depends on the accuracy of the measurement devices.
J(x) = [z− h(x)]′R−1[z− h(x)] + [x˜− x]′M−1[x˜− x] (5.3)







xˆk = x˜k + Kk(zk − z˜k)) (5.5)
Σk = [I−KkHk]Mk[I−KkHk]′ + KkRK′k (5.6)
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When using the bus load as the forecasting variable, the forecast state error
covariance matrix, Mk is estimated from the historical data. Since Mk is not
updated in the state forecasting step, Σk in (5.6) is not used in our approach.
From now onwards, we will omit the subscript in Mk.
5.3.3 Communication Failure in DSE
Cyber security is a rising concern in the power system operation. Cyber at-
tacks on power system can interrupt the communication links between RTUs
and control centers [25]. Communication failure will affect the reliable operation
of the power grid. Reference [68] shows that communication failure will delay the
device restoration time. Reference [69] uses sequential Monte Carlo simulation
to show that communication failure in power system will cause increase of load
shedding.
Most of the DSE literatures [40, 65, 67, 70] assume perfect communication sce-
nario. Researchers have realized that measurement data may not always arrive
at control center on time. There are some literatures discussing about DSE with
one time step random communication delay [71–73]. However, these literatures
have not covered scenarios where communication failure lasts longer than one
time step. Given the importance of the state estimation in the power system
and the possibility of communication failure, it is meaningful to study how to
perform dynamic state estimation under sustained communication failure.
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5.4 Problem formulation
To perform the dynamic state estimation under communication failure, we pro-
pose an approach that is based on the EKF with bus load as the forecasting
variable. The forecasting technique used in this chapter is time-forward kriging
which can forecast the load under partial communication failure by utilizing the
load information from the neighboring available regions. The time line of the
proposed method is shown in Fig. 5.1.
Similar to the EKF, there are two main steps in the proposed approach; state
forecasting and state filtering. In the state forecasting, load and system state are
forecast based on previous filtered results. This forecast state is then combined
with the current measurements (full or partial) at the filtering step to estimate
a more accurate state.
5.4.1 State Forecasting
The state forecasting step forecasts system state for the next time step. In the
proposed approach, we use bus load as the forecasting variable. There are two
steps to obtain the forecast system state. The first step is load forecasting which
forecasts load for the next time step (P˜L). The second step is to calculate the
corresponding forecast generation (G˜) to supply the forecast load. The forecast
load and generation are then used to calculate the forecast state through power
flow analysis.
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5.4.1.1 Load forecasting
There are several existing techniques to perform load forecasting with high ac-
curacy; for example, autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) or ar-
tificial neural network methods (ANN). However, this chapter proposes to use a
geostaticstical method called time-forward kriging, because of two reasons. The
first reason is that loads at different regions are highly correlated. An increase
of load at one region is possibly caused by weather effect which would lead to an
increase of load at nearby regions. The second reason is that kriging can perform
out of sample forecast. This means that kriging can forecast bus load without
using the data from the bus that we want to forecast. This feature of the kriging
method is helpful when there is a communication failure between certain RTUs
and the control center. For ARIMA and ANN, if communication failure lasts
very long and the latest measurements are not fed to the system, the forecasting
accuracy will drop significantly.
Time-forward kriging models a spatial temporal process by finding the correla-
tion/covariance among various locations. It has been previously used in solar
irradiance forecasting [50] and wind forecasting [49]. To apply kriging in power
system, due to the lack of physical distance, empirical kriging is used to estimate
the weights of load values PL (from m temporal lags and n spatial points) using
covariance structures fitted from historical data. At each bus i, the time-forward
kriging point estimation PˆLk (i) is given by:
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where C is the spatial-temporal variance-covariance matrix, c0 is the covariance
vector, c′0C
−1 is the weight.
C =

C0 C1 · · · Cm−1





Cm−1 Cm−2 · · · C0





C11,τ C12,τ · · · C1n,τ





Cn1,τ Cn2,τ · · · Cnn,τ

, ∈ Rn×n (5.9)
where Cij,τ = cov{PL(si, t), PL(sj , t− τ)}.
c0 =
(
c0,1 c0,2 · · · c0,m
)′




ci1,τ ci2,τ · · · cin,τ
)
, ∈ R1×n (5.11)
where τ ∈ {1, · · · ,m}, cij,τ = cov{PL(si, t), PL(sj , t − τ)}, i is the index of
forecasting region. The arrangement of PL must agree with the arrangement of
c0. For more details on kriging, please refer to [49, 50, 74].
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Different weight vector is built for different communication scenarios. c0 and C
is constructed according to the communication scenario:
• During full communication where all the load data are available, for n loads
and m time lag, c0 ∈ Rnm×1, C ∈ Rnm×nm. PL ∈ Rnm×1 is the load data
of the last m time steps from all n loads.
For example, in the NYISO data, there are 11 regions, if we use the previous
3 time steps to forecast the load, then m = 3, n = 11. Thus the dimensions
of the previous matrices are Cτ ∈ R11×11, C ∈ R33×33, c0 ∈ R33×1. To
forecast load at one region in the April, load data from January to March of
all the 11 regions are used to construct the C and c0. P
L in (5.7) contains
33 measurements from the 11 regions of the past three steps.
• During communication failure, if n′ load data are available where n′ ∈ {1,
2, · · · , n−1}, then only the available n′ historical data are used to construct
C ∈ Rn′m×n′m. c0 ∈ Rn′m×1 is the covariance between the forecast bus
with the n′ available data. PL ∈ Rn′m×1 is the available load data of the
last m time steps from the n′ loads.
For example, in the NYISO system, when data from one of the 11 regions is
not available, to forecast load at that region, load data from the 10 available
regions are used to construct C. However, load data from all 11 regions
are used to construct c0 in (5.11). P
L in (5.7) contains 30 measurements
from the remaining available 10 regions of the past three steps.
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5.4.1.2 Converting forecast load to system state
In order to apply the DSE, the forecast bus load must be converted to the forecast
state through the power flow analysis. To perform the power flow analysis, apart
from the load information, generation information from the generator buses is
also needed [75]. In this chapter, we assume that the system operator knows
how generators will response to load change through either economic dispatch
or automatic generation control. The generator information includes voltage
magnitude and power output. In this chapter, we use the same assumption as
[40] which assumes that generations from the generators increase at the same
rate as the total load. We also assume that the voltage magnitude of generator
buses is constant and known to the system operator. With sufficient information
of load and generation, the forecast state can be calculated through power flow
analysis.
When performing the power flow analysis during communication failure, we as-
sume that there is not topology error. Communication failure in power system
may cause loss of both analog measurement data and system structure informa-
tion, such as status of the transmission lines. Topology error will occur when
communication failure and system structure change happen at the same time
and location. However, if the system reconfiguration is cause by the protection
system, such as the protection rely in the transmission lines, DSE may be able
to predict the topology change because of its forecasting ability.
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5.4.2 State Filtering
The purpose of the state filtering step in DSE is to improve the accuracy of
the final estimated state when measurement data arrives. In our approach, we
use (5.3), (5.4), and (5.5) to find the filtered state. However, there are several
modifications.
M in (5.3) is the covariance of the forecast state error. In our approach, M
is fitted from historical data. M = cov(x˜ − xˆ) where xˆ is the estimated state
through WLS state estimation, x˜ is the forecast state through kriging and power
flow analysis. Prior to applying DSE, a training period is needed to fit this M
matrix. M can also be updated periodically after DSE starts. If M is to be
updated during DSE, then M = cov(x˜ − xˆ′) where xˆ′ is the estimated state
through DSE.
Due to the fact that we forecast load instead of system state, (5.1) and (5.2) are
not used in this chapter. Thus M and Σ are not updated according to (5.2) and
(5.6).
5.5 Case studies
5.5.1 A Test System
This section discusses how to prepare a test system to test our proposed ap-
proach. We use load data from New York Independent System Operator (NY-
ISO) 2011 and 2012 for the IEEE 14 bus system. The NYISO load data includes
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11 regions load data with five-minute interval, available at http://www.nyiso.
com. This load data set is ideal for the analysis since it has a small measurement
time interval of 5 minutes which is close to the time interval of state estimation.
The IEEE 14 bus system shown in Fig. 5.2 is used as a test system in this chapter
because it has exactly 11 load buses.
Figure 5.2: IEEE 14 bus test system
Due to the lack of 5 minutes system state data, the following procedures are
used to generate five minutes system state for the IEEE 14 bus system using
load pattern from NYISO.
1. Form an index matrix to link each load bus of IEEE 14 bus system to one
region of NYISO. The first row of the following matrix is the bus number of
IEEE 14 bus system. The second row is the corresponding NYISO region
number.
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( 2 3 4 5 6 9 10 11 12 13 141 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 )
2. Normalize the load from NYISO to the initial real and reactive load of the
corresponding IEEE 14 bus so that the test system operates near the initial
state. After this step, we will have real and reactive load data for the IEEE
14 bus system. Due to lack of reactive load information, we assume that
the system load has a constant power factor so only real power prediction
is needed. This assumption can be relaxed if the reactive power historical
data is available. In the latter case, two separate forecasting processes are
needed. One process is to forecast the real load and another is to forecast
the reactive load.
3. Add up the new real power load. Find the ratio of the new total load to
the IEEE 14 bus initial total load. Multiply this ratio to the generations
of all the generators. Here, we assume that generations from the genera-
tors increase at the same rate as the total load. This assumption can be
adjusted according to system operators since the system operators know
the generation plan ahead of the time[67].
4. Repeat the previous step for the reactive power.
5. Find the accurate system state (xT ) from the solution of power flow anal-
ysis for benchmarking purpose. This chapter applies Newton-Raphson al-
gorithm.
6. Calculate the accurate system measurement value zT = h(xT ) where h(.)
is the power flow equation derived from the current system structure.
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7. Add random measurement errors with zero mean and the following stan-
dard deviations (σvoltage = 0.004, σinjection = 0.01, σflow = 0.008) [76] to
the accurate measurement values. To better understand the performance
of WLS and DSE at different measurement errors, we create another 4 sets
of measurement errors by increasing the previous error standard deviations
up to 5 times. In total, there are 6 sets of measurement data with normal
distributed measurement errors at zero mean and the following standard
deviations of σvoltage = a ∗ 0.004, σinjection = a ∗ 0.01, σflow = a ∗ 0.008
, where a = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Note that a = 0 implies that the measurement
data has no measurement error. With full communication, the measure-
ment vector at time step k, z(k) ∈ R70×1 includes 14 × 2 inject power,
20× 2 line flows and voltage magnitude at buses 1 and 2.
For the IEEE 118 bus system, we test it with two data sets, one from NYISO
(11 regions) 5 minutes interval data, another from PJM (9 regions) hourly data,
available at http://www.pjm.com. In the IEEE 118 bus system, there are 91
load buses. Due to the lack of such amount of load data, we simulate these 91
load data by combining different region of the available data. For the NYISO,





= 165 > 91) to simulate the load data






= 126 > 91). The remaining procedures for the IEEE 118 bus system are
the same as the IEEE 14 bus system.
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5.5.2 Parameters In Load Forecasting
For the kriging forecasting technique, 2011 load data is used to find the seasonal
trend (polynomial regression with order of 10) and to construct the weight matrix
in (5.7). Three-month data prior to the estimation month are used to find the
weekly trend. For example, January, February and March load are used to find
the weekly trend of the April. Weekly trend is the average value of the same day
and same time of the day from the past three months. These trend data will be
deducted from the original load data before forecasting. The final forecast load
is the sum of the trend and forecast residual load. Our experimental results show
that m = 3 is a suitable time order. If m is increased further, it will marginally
improve the load forecasting accuracy at the cost of computation time. The
forecast state resulted from April is used to construct the forecast state error
matrix M in (5.3). For all the case studies below, the load data is five minutes
data from May 2012 to Dec 2012, a total of 70560 samples.
5.5.3 Performance Indicators
The purpose of the state estimation is to estimate the system state as accurate as
possible. The state variable for the IEEE 14 bus system is x ∈ R27×1, which in-
cludes 13 phase angles and 14 voltage magnitudes. For the IEEE 118 bus system,
x ∈ R235×1, which includes 117 phase angles and 118 voltage magnitudes. The
performance indicators used in this chapter are absolute phase error percentage
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∣∣∣∣∣ Vˆi(k)− V Ti (k)V Ti (k)
∣∣∣∣∣ (5.13)
where
nb number of buses
θˆi(k) ith bus filtered phase angle at time k
θTi (k) ith bus true phase angle at time k
Vˆi(k) ith bus filtered voltage magnitude at time k
V Ti (k) ith bus true voltage magnitude at time k
5.5.4 Test Cases
The proposed method has been tested under various communication failure sce-
narios.
1. No communication failure: This case represents the base case where all
the communication channels are perfectly in operation. This case is to
compare the performance of the proposed DSE with WLS.
2. Communication failures of a single substation: This scenario emulates situ-
ations where measurements from a single substation are lost for a sustained
period of time. During the communication failure, the measurement data
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from the failure bus cannot be received at the control center. Communica-
tion failure scenarios with different failure durations ranging from 5 minutes
to 2 days are studied. Apart from the communication failure durations,
failures at different time of the day may affect the system operation. Failure
events at different time of the day are studied to understand if communi-
cation failure at a certain time of the day affects state estimation accuracy
more severely than other time.
3. Communication failures of multiple substations: Extended the analysis to
communication failure at multiple stations.
Results of the above failure scenarios are presented in the following section.
5.6 Test Results
The following test cases are presented in this section; No communication failure,
sustained communication failure of a single substation, multiple time step com-
munication failure of a single substation, communication failure at a different
time of day of a single substation, and lastly, communication failures of multiple
substations.
For the IEEE 14 bus system, NYISO load data is used for the case studies. For
the IEEE 118 bus system, NYISO and PJM load data are used for the case
studies
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5.6.1 No communication failure
Most of the time state estimation is performed with no communication failure
where all measurements are available. Traditional WLS state estimation is fully
observable but the estimation error increases when measurement error increases.
Table 5.1 shows how WLS estimation error increases when measurement error
increases. Performance of DSE using the same data sets is shown in Table 5.2.
Fig. 5.3 and Fig. 5.4 compares the performance of WLS and DSE for the IEEE
14 bus system under no communication failure. From these two figures, we can
see that DSE has a smaller estimation error at all measurement error scenarios
when communication is fully available. This means that the proposed approach
improves the state estimation accuracy even when there is no communication
failure. Note that when there is no communication failure, the time-forward
kriging load forecasting technique can be replaced with other load forecasting
techniques.




mean max std mean max std
1 0.58 4.07 0.44 0.23 1.40 0.17
2 1.16 8.56 0.89 0.46 2.77 0.35
3 1.74 12.37 1.33 0.69 4.42 0.52
4 2.33 17.75 1.78 0.92 5.97 0.70
5 2.90 20.88 2.22 1.15 6.99 0.87
Apart from the accuracy improvement, DSE is also faster than WLS. On a DELL
core i5, 3.1GHz PC, for the IEEE 14 bus system, to complete the 70560 samples,
WLS takes around 50 minutes (0.043sec per sample) while DSE only takes around
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mean max std mean max std
1 0.38 3.80 0.30 0.12 0.73 0.09
2 0.75 5.24 0.58 0.24 1.64 0.18
3 1.11 8.27 0.86 0.36 2.35 0.27
4 1.46 11.78 1.13 0.48 3.32 0.36
5 1.83 14.36 1.42 0.60 3.64 0.45




























Figure 5.3: Average εθi comparison at different measurement error with no
communication failure for the IEEE 14 bus system
20 minutes (0.017sec per sample). The 20 minutes of DSE approach includes the
detrending and fitting process.
The main computation burden for our proposed approach is the power flow
analysis when converting the forecast load to the forecast state. This power flow
analysis is faster than the WLS state estimation. The matrix in the power flow
analysis is based on the number of nodes in the network whereas the matrix in
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Figure 5.4: Average εVi comparison at different measurement error with no
communication failure for the IEEE 14 bus system
the WLS state estimation is based on the number of measurements. In general,
the number of nodes is smaller than the number of measurements. For example,
in the IEEE14 bus system, the measurement vector z and measurement Jacobian
matrix H, have a dimension of 70*1 and [70 by 27] which are bigger than the
power flow Jacobian matrix [27 by 27]. This is why DSE is faster than WLS.
For the IEEE 118 bus system, we have tested it using NYISO 5 minutes interval
and PJM hourly load data. Fig. 5.5 and Fig. 5.6 show the performance of WLS
and DSE for the IEEE 118 bus system. For the NYISO data, DSE out performs
WLS when measurement error a > 2 . For the PJM data, WLS performs better
than DSE. This is because PJM data is hourly load. The accuracy of load
forecasting is lower for the hourly data. Comparing Fig. 5.5 and Fig. 5.6, we
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can see that our proposed approach is feasible when SCADA gathers data at a
high frequency.


























Figure 5.5: Average εθi comparison at different measurement error with no
communication failure for the IEEE 118 bus system using NYISO load data
5.6.2 Sustained Communication failure
In all the DSE literature, only one step measurement delay has been studied.
Considering that SCADA system measures system data at a time interval of few
seconds [77], a one state estimation step (five minutes) delay is not very practical.
Thus a more thorough study of communication delay/failure is needed.
In this case study, we start with a discussion of sustained single bus communica-
tion failure. When sustained communication failure happens at certain bus, we
assume that measurement of the injected power and the bus voltage magnitude
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Figure 5.6: Average εθi comparison at different measurement error with no
communication failure for the IEEE 118 bus system using PJM load data
at that bus are unavailable. However, the line flow is still available since line flow
can be measured at the other end of the transmission line. In this case study and
latter case studies with communication failure, for the WLS, the previous cached
measurement value will be used for the communication failure bus. For the DSE,
the forecast measurement will be used for the buses with communication failure.
In this case study, a sustained communication failure of one month is tested.
The sustained single bus communication failure lasting for a whole month may
be unlikely because the system operator will take action within few hours after
the communication failure occurred. Nevertheless, the purpose of this case study
is to test the capability of the proposed approach. During the failure month, no
measurement from the failure bus will be received in the control center. Two
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3D plots that compare the performance of the WLS and DSE for the IEEE 14
bus system are in Fig. 5.7 and 5.8. Overall, it is clear that DSE performs better




































Figure 5.7: Average εθi at different measurement error with single station
communication failure for the IEEE 14 bus system
For the IEEE 118 bus system, we have tested communication failure for bus
number 59 which has a relative high load demand. Fig. 5.9 shows the average
phase error of all buses with communication failure at bus 59. Comparing the
Fig. 5.9 and Fig. 5.5, we can see that the impact of single station communication
failure on the overall phase error is not very significant for a big system. However,
Fig. 5.10 is the average phase error on bus 59 itself when communication failure
happens at bus 59. Fig. 5.10 shows that the proposed DSE approach is more
accurate than WLS.
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Figure 5.8: Average εVi at different measurement error with single station
communication failure for the IEEE 14 bus system
5.6.3 Communication failure duration
In this case study, communication failure with different duration is studied to
find the impact of restoration time on the power system state estimation. The
test is applied to all 70560 samples for measurement error a = 1 with different
failure duration at bus 2 of the IEEE 14 bus system. Figs. 5.11 and Figs. 5.12
show how average estimation error changes when delay duration varies from 5
minutes to 48 hours for the IEEE 14 bus system. To understand the behavior
of the WLS, the average real power injection is also plotted in the same figure.
The mean injected power is calculated as E(|Pinject(k) − Pinject(k − d)|) where
d is the delay duration, Pinject(k) is the real power injection at time k. Figs.
5.11 and Figs. 5.12 show that there is a trend of estimation error variation for
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Figure 5.9: Average εθi at different measurement error with bus 59 commu-
nication failure for the IEEE 118 bus system using NYISO load data
WLS state estimation. The trend of the estimation error is similar to the trend
of injected real power. Figs. 5.11 and Figs. 5.12 also show that WLS estimation
error has a daily trend with increasing average. This means that system operator
should response to the communication failure as soon as possible to minimize
the impact of communication failure on WLS state estimation.
For the DSE, there is no periodic error variation. This consistent performance
of the DSE is due to the fact that delayed data is not used in the DSE. During
communication failure, regardless of the communication failure duration, DSE
utilizes the neighboring load data to forecast the missing measurement. This ap-
proach eliminates the effect of failure duration on the DSE. Comparing DSE with
WLS, it is clear that DSE has a smaller estimation error for all communication
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Figure 5.10: Average phase error at bus 59 at different measurement error
with bus 59 communication failure for the IEEE 118 bus system using NYISO
load data
failure durations.
5.6.4 Multi-step ahead forecasting
Multi-step ahead load forecasting can forecast load when communication failure
duration is not too long. There are many load forecasting methods in the lit-
erature. In this chapter, we use ARIMA to perform the multi-step ahead load
forecasting. The reasons that we benchmark our proposed method with ARIMA
are as follows.
• ARIMA has been widely used in load forecasting literature with good fore-
casting accuracy. Both ARIMA and kriging are statistical load forecasting
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Figure 5.11: Average εθi comparison at different failure durations with single
station communication failure for the IEEE 14 bus system. x axis: failure steps.
y axis: average εθi
methods.
• The tuning parameters for model fitting can be controlled to be the same.
In our case study, we use previous year data to fit yearly and seasonal
trend and use the last three month data prior to the forecasting moth to
fit the weekly trend for both ARIMA and kriging. This allows better model
consistency so that the benchmarking can be done fairly.
Results for the IEEE 14 bus system from the ARIMA and our approach are
compared in Fig. 5.13. We have tested communication failure duration from
five minutes to 12 hours. When the communication failure duration is small,
the performances of ARIMA and kriging based DSE are similar. However, the
load forecasting accuracy from multi-step ahead forecasting will drop when the
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Figure 5.12: Average εVi comparison at different failure durations with single
station communication failure for the IEEE 14 bus system. x axis: failure steps.
y axis: average εVi
forecast time interval increases. This will cause the state estimation accuracy to
drop, as shown in Fig. 5.13. Since kriging uses measurement data from buses
with functional communication, the state estimation accuracy is not affected by
the failure duration.
5.6.5 Failure at different time of the day
Communication failure at different time of the day may cause different impacts
on the state estimation accuracy. There is no existing literature that studies
the impact of communication failure at different time of the day. In this case
study, one time step communication delay (five minutes delay), is studied with
measurement error a = 1 at bus 3 of the IEEE 14 bus system. Note that from
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Figure 5.13: Average εθi comparison between ARIMA and kriging when load
data from bus 2 of the IEEE 14 bus system is not available for different failure
durations. x axis: failure duration. y axis: average εθi
the previous analysis, we know that the performance of our approach will not be
affected by the communication failure duration. The testing period for this case
study is also from May to December 2012.
The average phase estimation errors from WLS and DSE are shown in Fig. 5.14.
From Fig. 5.14, we can see that WLS estimation error εθi has similar variation
trend to the system load (plotted in the same figure with rescaling, magnitude
not showed). For the DSE, there is no clear trend throughout the day. This
is because kriging forecasting in DSE uses detrended data which has no weekly
or seasonal trend. This property of proposed DSE guarantees accurate state
estimation whenever communication failure happens.
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Figure 5.14: Average εθi at different failure moment in different station for
the IEEE 14 bus system. x axis: day of the week. y axis: time of the day. z
axis: average εθi
5.6.6 Multi-station Failure
Apart from the single station communication failure, multi-station communi-
cation failure is also possible. In some cases, RTU measurements are firstly
gathered at a data concentrator where data are collected and sent to the con-
trol center [78]. If the communication link between the data concentrator and
the control center is blocked, then measurement data from multiple stations will
become unavailable. For WLS state estimation, when multiple measurements
are unavailable, the system may become unobservable. For the DSE, kriging can
perform load forecasting given that at least one bus load data is still available. A
case study of communication failure at both bus one and two for the IEEE 14 bus
system is conducted. Results from WLS and DSE are compared in Fig. 5.15 and
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Fig. 5.16. From these two figures, we can see that DSE has a smaller estimation
error than WLS under multi-station communication failure scenario.




























Figure 5.15: Average εθi comparison when both bus one and two fails for the
IEEE 14 bus system.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, a new approach of DSE using kriging based load forecasting
method is proposed to address communication failure on power system state es-
timation. The proposed approach has been tested with various communication
failure scenarios. Result shows that the proposed DSE approach is more ac-
curate than WLS under no communication failure and communication failures.
The proposed approach is also faster than the traditional WLS. From the case
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Figure 5.16: Average εVi comparison when both bus one and two fails for
the IEEE 14 bus system.
study of failure duration and failure time of the day, we can see that the pro-
posed approach has a more consistent performance than the WLS and multi-step
ahead forecasting. Compared with WLS, failure duration and failure time have
a smaller impact on the proposed approach. The proposed approach can also
handle multiple communication failures where traditional WLS becomes unob-
servable. This chapter is focused on DSE with communication failure. Future
works include updating forecast error covariance matrix M, false data injection
detection, topology error detection and DSE with system reconfiguration.
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Chapter 6
Detecting False Data Injection
Attacks In AC State
Estimation
6.1 Overview
Estimating power system states accurately is crucial to the reliable operation of
power grids. Traditional weighted least square (WLS) state estimation methods
face the rising threat of cyber-attacks, such as false data injection attacks, which
can pass the bad data detection process in WLS state estimation. In this chap-
ter, we propose a new detection method to detect false data injection attacks by
tracking the dynamics of measurement variations. The Kullback-Leibler distance
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(KLD) is used to calculate the distance between two probability distributions de-
rived from measurement variations. When false data are injected into the power
systems, the probability distributions of the measurement variations will deviate
from the historical data, thus leading to a larger Kullback-Leibler distance. The
proposed method is tested on IEEE 14 bus system using load data from NYISO
with different attack scenarios. We have also tested our method on false data
injection attacks that replace current measurement data with historical measure-
ment data. Test results show that the proposed approach can accurately detect
most of the attacks.
6.2 Introduction
State estimation is an important function in power grid energy management
system (EMS) [3]. To perform the state estimation, the power system control
center gathers measurement data from remote terminal units (RTUs). These
data generally include real and reactive power injections, real and reactive power
flow in the transmission lines, and voltage magnitude at generator buses. The
measurement data are converted to system state (bus phase angle and voltage
magnitude) using DC state estimation or AC state estimation.
Accurately estimating system states is important because the system state in-
formation from the state estimation is used in other functions of EMS, such as
transmission stability analysis, load shedding, etc. The measurement data gath-
ered from the RTUs may contain small random measurement errors, which can
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be caused by noise or inaccuracy of measurement equipment [4, 5]. These small
measurement errors are generally independent from each other. Weighted least
square state (WLS) estimation can estimate the system state accurately when
the variances of these small measurement errors are known.
Apart from the small measurement errors caused by the noise and inaccuracy of
measurement, it is possible that measurement data contain larger errors caused
by biased meters or telecommunication failure [4]. These larger measurement
errors are considered independent and can be detected using residual analysis of
traditional bad data detection method [4, 5].
In recent years, cyber-attacks are emerging threats to the secure operation of
power systems [11–13]. It is found in [6] that a new type of cyber-attack called
false data injection attack can pass the traditional bad data detection in power
system state estimation. A successful false data injection attack was initially
illustrated by DC state estimation which relies on linear measurement function
z = Hx + e where z, x and e are the vectors of measurements, system states
and errors, respectively. A manipulated measurement vector zbad = Hxbad + e
will not be detected by the traditional bad data detection process because the
measurement residuals with false data injection attacks are the same as the
measurement residuals with no false data injection attacks. Results from [79]
show that an attack using a DC model may trigger the bad data detector in an
AC state estimation, but attackers can still inject false data into the AC state
estimation. Both DC state estimation and AC state estimation are prone to the
false data injection attacks.
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Several methods have been proposed to alleviate false data injection attacks.
These methods can be divided into two categories: protection based and detec-
tion based [80]. The protection based methods [80–84] which defend against the
false data injection attacks by protecting certain sensors have two drawbacks.
The first drawback is the decrease of redundancy. This is because only the pro-
tected measurements are trusted and used. The second drawback is that the
protection may not be secure all of the time. The state estimation would be in
danger if attackers can penetrate the protection and manipulate the measure-
ments. The detection based methods [85–87], by analyzing the raw measure-
ments, are able to detect those abnormal ones that do not fit the distribution
of historical measurements. However, these methods do not have the ability to
detect false data that fits the distribution of historical measurements, such as
previous measurement data.
In the literature, there are many time series anomaly detection methods [88–
90]. Most of these methods have specific applications and have not been used
in power system analysis. In this chapter, a new detection based method is
proposed to address the limitations of the existing methods. The key idea of the
proposed method is to track the dynamics of the measurements by calculating
distance indices between adjacent steps. Distance indices can be calculated from
historical measurements using the Kullback-Leibler distance [91]. A threshold
of the distance index, calculated from historical data, will be used to detect
potential false data injection attacks. The distance index between the current
time step k and the previous step k − 1 should fall within the threshold when
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there are no false data injection attacks. If the distance index is significantly
different from historical distance values, the newly received measurements are
likely to be manipulated.
The remaining parts of the chapter are organized as follows. Section 6.3 explains
the background of state estimation, bad data detection and false data injection
attacks. Section 6.4 discusses the existing methods and our proposed method
to detect false data injection attacks. Section 6.5 explains how to build the test
system and calculate the distance index. Section 6.6 shows the test results of
different attacking scenarios. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.7.
6.3 Background
Based on the measurement function that models the measurement and system
state, there are two ways to perform state estimation: DC state estimation and
AC state estimation. It is possible to inject false data in both DC and AC state
estimation.
6.3.1 DC state estimation
DC state estimation is based on the following linear measurement function (6.1):
z = Hx + e (6.1)
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where z ∈ Rm×1 is the measurement vector that contains m measurements.
These m measurements include real power injection at buses and real power
flow in transmission lines. x ∈ Rn×1 is the system state vector. In DC state
estimation, x consists of phase angles at all the buses except the slack bus where
the phase angle is set to be zero. H ∈ Rm×n is the linear measurement function.
H is determined according to the physical structure of the power grid. e ∈ Rm×1
is a vector of measurement errors. R is the diagonal matrix representing the
covariance matrix of the measurement errors.
DC state estimation assumes that bus voltage magnitudes are all equal to one.
All shunt elements and branch resistances are negligible. The real power flow
between buses i and j is given by Pij =
θi−θj
xij
where xij is the reactance of the
branch between buses i and j, θi and θj are the phase angles at bus i and j
respectively.
The estimated system state xˆ from DC state estimation is calculated by mini-
mizing the objective function (6.2).
F (x) = (z−Hx)TR−1(z−Hx) (6.2)
The xˆ that minimizes (6.2) is given by:
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xˆ = (HTR−1H)−1HTR−1z (6.3)
6.3.2 Bad Data Detection and False Data Injection Attacks
Traditional bad data detection is based on the residual analysis of r = z−Hxˆ.
If the measurement errors are independent and follow normal distribution, then
the residual ||r|| follow a chi-square distribution. To detect the existence of bad
data, the residual is compared with a threshold value calculated with a certain
confidence interval. However, this way of detecting bad data faces a threat from
an newly discovered attack.
According to [6], an attacker can pass the bad data detection test if the at-
tacker has knowledge of the system structure (H) and can manipulate multiple
measurements at the same time. Mathematically, the manipulated measurement
zbad = z + a, can pass the bad data detection test if a = Hc where a is the
malicious data added to the original measurements, and c is the injected error
on the system state. After the false data injection, DC state estimation will
get an erroneous system state xˆbad = xˆ + c from the manipulated measurement
data.
False data injection attacks can pass the traditional bad data detection tests
because the residual from the false data injection attacks, rbad = zbad−Hxˆbad =
z + a − H(xˆ + c) = z − Hxˆ = r. This means that the measurement residual
will not increase after the false data have been injected to the system. Thus
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traditional bad data detection methods cannot detect the false data injection
attacks.
6.3.3 AC state estimation false data injection
Different from DC state estimation, AC state estimation uses a nonlinear function
between measurements and system state. The nonlinear measurement function
is shown in (6.4):
z = h(x) + e (6.4)
where h() is a nonlinear function between the measurement vector z and the
system state vector x.
In AC state estimation, system state variables include not only bus phase angles,
but also bus voltage magnitudes. Recent research in [79] expands the DC false
data injection into AC false data injection. In that research, it is found that
in order to pass the AC state estimation bad data detection, the attacker needs
to know the value of the system state and the system configuration. In AC
state estimation, the false data added to the measurement a can pass bad data
detection if a = h(xˆ + c)− h(xˆ).
In this chapter, we focus our analysis on false data injection attacks on AC state
estimation. The proposed method is also applicable for DC state estimation.
When the attacker wants to inject false data into AC state estimation, there
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are generally two targets. One is to manipulate certain system state variables;
another is to manipulate certain measurements.
6.3.3.1 Targeting system state variables
In AC state estimation, there are two types of state variables: bus phase angle (θ)
and bus voltage magnitude (V ). If the attacker targets a specific state variable,
all the measurements that depend on this state variable will be affected. The
measurement values are related to the system state by the following equations
[4].








Vj(Gij sin θij −Bij cos θij) (6.6)
• Real and reactive power flow from bus i to bus j:
Pij =V
2
i (gsi + gij)
− ViVj(gij cos θij + bij sin θij) (6.7)
Qij =− V 2i (bsi + bij)
− ViVj(gij sin θij − bij cos θij) (6.8)
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Where
Vi voltage at bus i
θi phase angle at bus i
θij θi − θj
Gij + jBij line admittance between bus i and j
gsi + jbsi admittance of the shunt branch at bus i
Ωi set of buses connected to bus i
From (6.5)-(6.8), it is clear that to target one state variable, for example Vi,
the measurements that need to be manipulated are Pi, Qi, Pij , and Qij where
j ∈ Ωi. If the attacker intends to change multiple states at the same time, then
the attacker needs to manipulate even more measurements. For example, if the
attacker wants to change Vk where k ∈ Ua is a set of bus numbers, then the
measurements that need to be manipulated are Pk, Qk, Pkj , and Qkj where
k ∈ Ua, j ∈ Ωk.
6.3.3.2 Targeting certain measurements
A specific measurement in the state estimation is determined by system struc-
ture and at least two system variables. To change a specific measurement, an
attacker needs to change at least one state variable that controls the targeted
measurement. To pass the bad data detection, an attacker needs to manipulate
all the measurements that are affected by the manipulated state variable.
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6.4 Methodology
6.4.1 Current defending methods
The existing countermeasures can be categorized into: protection-based ap-
proaches and detection-based approaches [80].
6.4.1.1 Protection-based approaches
References [80–84] proposed to prevent false data injection attacks by protect-
ing measurements from certain sensors. It is possible to calculate the minimal
set of measurements that needs to be protected for both DC and AC state es-
timation. However, there are two drawbacks of the protection-based approach.
The first drawback is that measurement redundancy drops since only the pro-
tected measurements can be trusted. The second drawback is that protecting
of measurement may not work 100% of the time. If the attacker is capable of
penetrating the protection, then state estimation is still in great danger.
6.4.1.2 Detection-based approaches
Another type of countermeasure proposed by several works [85–87] is to detect
potential false data injection attacks using Bayesian framework . The Bayesian
framework assumes that the vector of system states is a random vector with
Gaussian distribution N (µx,Σx). The distribution is estimated from the histor-
ical data. The estimated distribution is used as a reference in the hypothesis test
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for the new state. This method will capture the attacks that lead to extreme
abnormal system states. The drawback of Bayesian framework method is that
it cannot detect attacks that inject measurement data that fit the distribution
of historical data. For example, if an attacker replaces the current measurement
data with previous measurement data which fall in the distribution, the Bayesian
based method cannot detect the attack.
In this chapter, we propose a new method that can overcome the above draw-
backs.
6.4.2 Proposed method
The proposed method detects false data injection attacks by tracking the dynam-
ics of the measurement data. To quantify the measurement variation, we use two
distance indices: absolute distance and Kullback-Leibler distance. For both dis-
tance indices, there are two probability distribution p and q. The probability
distribution q is the distribution of measurement variation from the historical
data. p is the distribution of measurement variation between the current time
step and the previous time step. When there is no false data injection, the
distance index would be relatively small. When false data are injected into the
power systems, the distance index will increase. By comparing the distance index
of current time step with the historical distance index values, we can determine
if false data are injected in to the power systems.
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6.4.2.1 Absolute Distance
This is a naive way of comparing the difference between two probability distri-







The Kullback-Leibler distance (KLD) calculates the difference between two prob-












In the above definition, we use the convention that 0 ln 0q = 0 and p ln
p
0 = ∞.
The Kullback-Leibler distance is also called the relative entropy. The Kullback-
Leibler distance is not a true distance metric as it is not symmetric (D(p||q) may
not be equal to D(q||p)), and it does not satisfy a triangle inequality. It is always
non-negative and is zero if and only if p = q.
The Kullback-Leibler distance was introduced by Solomon Kullback and Richard
Leibler in 1951. It has been used in many applications. Reference [92] uses the
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KLD to retrieve texture. In [93], the KLD is used to help improve the audio
search. The KLD can even indicate nonstationarity change of neurological signals




In this section, we discuss how to prepare a test system to test the performance
of our proposed method. The test system used in this chapter is based on the
IEEE 14 bus system, as shown in Fig. 6.1.
Figure 6.1: IEEE 14 bus test system
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The load data used in the test system are based on New York Independent
System Operator (NYISO) from 2012. There are 11 load regions in the NYISO






















































































Figure 6.2: NYISO map of 11 electric power grid regions in New York Stat,
USA
Due to the lack of five minutes system state data, we perform the following
procedures to generate the system state data from NYISO load pattern.
1. Link each load bus of IEEE 14 bus system with one region of NYISO using
the following matrix.
( 2 3 4 5 6 9 10 11 12 13 141 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 )
The first row of the matrix is the bus number of IEEE 14 bus system. The
second row is the corresponding NYISO region number.
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2. Normalize the load of NYISO to the initial real and reactive load of the
corresponding IEEE 14 bus, so that the test system operates near the initial
state of the IEEE 14 bus system. After this step, we will have real and
reactive load data for the IEEE 14 bus system. Due to lack of reactive load
information, we assume that the system load has a constant power factor
so only real power prediction is needed. This assumption can be relaxed if
the historical data of reactive power is available.
3. Add up the new real power load. Find the ratio of the new total load to
the IEEE 14 bus initial total load. Multiply this ratio to the generations
of all the generators. Here, we assume that generations from the genera-
tors increase at the same rate as the total load. This assumption can be
adjusted according to system operators since the system operators know
the generation plan ahead of the time [67].
4. Repeat the previous step for the reactive power.
5. Calculate the system state (x) using power flow analysis.
6. Calculate the system measurement value z = h(x), where h() is the power
flow equation derived from the system structure.
6.5.2 Simulate false data injection attacks
To test the proposed method, we simulate false data injection attacks by tar-
geting different system state variables. The manipulated system state after the
114
Chapter 6. Detecting False Data Injection Attacks In AC State Estimation
attack is denoted by xbad = x + c. The corresponding measurement for the
manipulated system state is zbad = h(xbad).
For AC state estimation in IEEE 14 bus system, there are 27 state variables (13
bus phase angles and 14 voltage magnitudes). We simulate false data injection
attacks on each of these 27 state variables.
6.5.3 Measurement variation
Power systems are considered as quasi-static systems. The power system state
changes constantly but slowly. This means that measurements gathered from the
RTUs should vary slowly. The measurement data gathered from RTUs at time
step k is denoted by z(k). The measurement variation is defined as z(k)−z(k−1).
Fig. 6.3 shows the histogram of measurement variation from January 2012 to
October 2012 with no false data injection attacks. From Fig. 6.3, we can see that
most of the measurement variations are small and close to zero. This histogram
is converted to probability density function q in (6.10).
When there are no false data injection attacks, the distributions of measurement
variation are similar between different months. Fig. 6.4 is the histogram of
measurement variation in November 2012 with no false data injection attacks.
Comparing Fig. 6.3 with Fig. 6.4, we can see that two histograms are quite
similar.
However, when false data are injected to the power system, the histogram of the
measurement variation will be different. To illustrate the impact of false data
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Figure 6.3: Histogram of measurement variation from January to October
2012

















Figure 6.4: Histogram of measurement variation November 2012
injection on measurement variation, we simulate 10% incremental attack on the
first variable of the system state (θ2), c = (0.1 ∗ θ2, 0, · · · , 0). We simulate this
attack for each time step of December. Fig. 6.5 is the histogram of measure-
ment variation (zbad(k)− z(k− 1)) when false data are injected into the system.
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From Fig. 6.4 and Fig. 6.5, we can see that false data injection will affect the
distribution of measurement variation.

















Figure 6.5: Histogram of measurement variation with false data injection
attacks
6.5.4 Distance Index
To quantify the difference between two distributions, we test two difference in-
dices. For both indices, there are two probability distributions p and q. In this
chapter, q is derived from the historical data of measurement variations (Fig.
6.3). p is derived at each time step. For the IEEE 14 bus system, there are 70
measurements at each time step. It includes real and reactive power injection,
real and reactive power flow in the transmission line and voltage magnitude at
generator buses. The variation of these 70 measurements at each time step is
used to derive p.
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6.5.4.1 Absolute distance
We firstly test absolute distance between p and q using (6.9).

















Figure 6.6: Histogram of absolute distance on November with no false data
injection attacks
Fig. 6.6 is the histogram of absolute distances for November with no false data
injection attacks. The absolute distances range from 0.1 to 0.6.














Figure 6.7: Histogram of absolute distance on December with false data
injection attacks
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Fig. 6.7 is the histogram of absolute distance for December with false data in-
jection attacks. Compared with absolute distance with no attack in Fig. 6.6, the
absolute distances with false data injection attacks are mostly larger. However,
there is some overlapping between Fig. 6.6 and Fig. 6.7 around 0.4 to 0.6. This
means that when we get a measurement sample with absolute distance between
0.4 and 0.6, this sample can be from either no attack or with attack. Thus
absolute distance is not an ideal candidate to test false data injection attacks.
6.5.4.2 Kullback-Leibler Distance
KLD is calculated based on (6.10). Fig. 6.8 is the histogram of KLD for Novem-
ber with no false data injection attacks. The histogram shows that the KLD of
most samples in November are less than 0.45. Fig. 6.9 is the histogram of KLD
for December with false data injection attacks. In Fig. 6.9, KLD of all samples
are larger than 0.45. By comparing the Fig. 6.8 with the Fig. 6.9, we can see
that false data injection attacks will increase KLD.
Unlike the absolute distance, there is much less overlapping in the histograms
with the KLD. To detect false data injection attacks, we set a KLD threshold
from the previous data (Fig. 6.8). This threshold is then compared with ev-
ery sample during runtime (Fig. 6.9). If the runtime KLD is larger than the
threshold, it is likely that false data have been injected into the system.
Selecting the proper threshold affects the accuracy of detection. Threshold repre-
sents the tolerance of measurement variation for the detection algorithm. When
the threshold is set to high, the proposed method will potentially not be able to
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detect certain attacks. When the threshold is set to low, some true measurement
data may be classified as false data.
It is possible to use the maximum historical distance as the threshold. However,
the maximum distance may be too large. In Fig. 6.8, the maximum KLD is
1.19 which is higher than most of the samples in Fig. 6.9. If we use 1.19 as the
threshold, we cannot detect the false data injection attacks. Please note that
the extreme large historical distance may be caused by the measurement error
in the test system data.
To solve this problem, in this chapter, we use a maximum KLD from historical
data with certain confidence level. For example, the 99% confidence level means
that the threshold value is larger than 99% of the historical data. In Fig. 6.8,
the 99% confidence maximum KLD is 0.35 which is smaller than most of the
samples in Fig. 6.9. This 99% confidence maximum is used as threshold to
detect potential false data injection attacks.
6.6 Results and Discussion
In this section, the proposed method is tested with two different types of false
data injection attacks.
• Attack on state variable: One system variable is targeted and all measure-
ments linked to that system variable are replaced with false data.
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Figure 6.8: Histogram of Kullback-Leibler distance on November with no
false data injection attacks


















Figure 6.9: Histogram of Kullback-Leibler distance on December with false
data injection attacks
• Attack using previous measurement data: The intruder replaces the current
measurement data with older measurement data.
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6.6.1 Attack State Variable
To test the performance of the proposed method, we simulate false data injection
attacks on each system state variable. For each attack, one system state variable
is decreased or increased by certain percentage of its original value. Table 6.1
summarizes the test results.
Each row of Table 6.1 represents one system state variable that is targeted.
For each targeted state variable, we simulate five injection amounts, which are
90%, 95%, 100%, 105%, and 110% of the original value. 90% means that the
manipulated system state variable is 10% smaller than the true value. 100%
means that there is no attack.
Result for each targeted state variable and injected amount is shown in two for-
mats, UD and %. UD stands for undetected samples. % indicates the percentage
of samples that are not detected, which is equal to UD divided by total samples.
In the case study, there are 8927 samples for each attacking scenario.
The second and third columns of Table 6.1 show that when the manipulated
state variable is 90% of the original value, our proposed method can detect most
of attack scenarios with no undetected sample. When the manipulated state
variable is 95% of its variable, there are slightly more samples that cannot be
detected. This is because 95% is closer to the original value than 90%, thus the
attacks have smaller impact on the measurements.
Table 6.1 also shows that it is difficult to detect false data injection attacks for
certain state variables. In our case study, manipulating state variables at bus 3,
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7, and 8 is difficult to detect. This is because these buses have fewer connections
to the remaining parts of the grid. Manipulating these state variables affect
fewer measurements.
The seventh and eighth columns of Table 6.1 are the test results when there is no
false data injection attacks. The test results show that our method will classify
99% of these test samples as no attack. This means that our method is not likely
to classify a good measurement (no attack) as false data.
Table 6.1: Summary of Test Results for Data Injection Attacks
Inject
Org*0.9 Org*0.95 Org*1 Org*1.05 Org*1.1
UD % UD % UD % UD % UD %
θ2 0 0% 118 1% 8848 99% 141 2% 0 0%
θ3 2004 22% 4894 55% 8848 99% 5004 56% 2885 32%
θ4 0 0% 0 0% 8848 99% 0 0% 0 0%
θ5 0 0% 0 0% 8848 99% 0 0% 0 0%
θ6 0 0% 0 0% 8848 99% 0 0% 0 0%
θ7 5192 58% 6225 70% 8848 99% 6271 70% 5438 61%
θ8 8527 96% 8529 96% 8848 99% 8520 95% 8515 95%
θ9 0 0% 0 0% 8848 99% 0 0% 0 0%
θ10 0 0% 1 0% 8848 99% 3 0% 0 0%
θ11 0 0% 0 0% 8848 99% 1 0% 0 0%
θ12 0 0% 111 1% 8848 99% 175 2% 0 0%
θ13 0 0% 0 0% 8848 99% 0 0% 0 0%
θ14 0 0% 418 5% 8848 99% 634 7% 0 0%
V1 0 0% 0 0% 8848 99% 0 0% 0 0%
V2 0 0% 0 0% 8848 99% 0 0% 0 0%
V3 0 0% 137 2% 8848 99% 179 2% 0 0%
V4 0 0% 0 0% 8848 99% 0 0% 0 0%
V5 0 0% 0 0% 8848 99% 0 0% 0 0%
V6 0 0% 0 0% 8848 99% 0 0% 0 0%
V7 0 0% 1764 20% 8848 99% 1756 20% 1 0%
V8 8539 96% 8539 96% 8848 99% 8544 96% 8544 96%
V9 0 0% 0 0% 8848 99% 0 0% 0 0%
V10 0 0% 0 0% 8848 99% 0 0% 0 0%
V11 0 0% 0 0% 8848 99% 0 0% 0 0%
V12 0 0% 0 0% 8848 99% 0 0% 0 0%
V13 0 0% 0 0% 8848 99% 0 0% 0 0%
V14 0 0% 0 0% 8848 99% 0 0% 0 0%
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6.6.2 Attack using previous measurement data (replay attack)
Another type of false data injection attacks is to replace the current measurement
data with previous measurement data. zbad(k) = z(k− δ) where k is the current
time step, δ is the time gap. Please note that we are not looking at continuous
replay attack where zbad(k− 1) = z(k− 1− δ), zbad(k) = z(k− δ), zbad(k+ 1) =
z(k + 1 − δ). The proposed method is meant to detect injection attack at time
step k where there is no attack before time step k.
This type of replay attack does not require the system configuration information
as long as the system configuration has not been changed during δ. The manip-
ulated measurements and system states will still fit the distribution of historical
records. This makes it is difficult to detect using existing detection methods.
However, our method is based on the variation of the measurement, not the
measurement itself. This means if the time gap δ is significant, our method will
be able to detect the attack. We have tested our method using different time
gaps. The results from the testing are shown in Fig. 6.10.
The time gaps that have been tested vary from 30 minutes to 24 hours. Fig.
6.10 shows that the number of undetected samples decreases using KLD when
the time gap increases for the first 12 hours. After 12 hours, the number of
undetected samples increases. This phenomenon is caused by the periodicity of
the power system. For example, the load at 9 AM today is likely to be more
similar to the load at 9 AM yesterday than 9 PM yesterday. This is the reason
why the detection is more accurate when δ equals 12 hours than 24 hours.
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The test results also show that when the time gap is small, our method may
not be able to detect the attack. However, a smaller time gap means that the
impact on the measurement is also smaller. Comparing KLD approach and
absolute distance approach, we can see that the KLD approach out performs the
absolute distance approach.






















Figure 6.10: False data injection attacks with replay attacks. Tested on 8927
samples
6.7 Summary
False data injection attacks threaten the secure operation of power grids. In
this chapter, a new detection method is proposed to detect false data injection
attacks. The detection method is based on the Kullback-Leibler distance which
calculates distance between two distributions, p and q. In this chapter, measure-
ment variation from the historical data is used to derive the q. For each time
step, p is derived from the measurement variation between the current time step
and the previous time step. Under normal conditions with no false data injection
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attacks, the KLD is quite small. When false data are injected into the system,
the KLD will be larger than normal, allowing for detection of the attack.
We have tested our method using different attacking scenarios. Test results
show that the proposed method can accurately detect most of the attacks. The
proposed method is also capable of detecting false data injection attacks that
use previous measurements.
During the case study, we found it difficult to detect false data injection attacks
on certain state variables. Besides, the proposed method will not work very
well for continuous small-scale attacks and continuous replay attacks. Detecting







Topology errors can cause significant state estimation error or even divergence of
power flow solution, which undermines the reliable operation of power grids. Un-
detected topology errors lead to dangerous situational unawareness in the control
center; for example, an unknown transmission line outage may cause a cascading
failure that leads to a rolling blackout. Existing detection methods are based on
DC state estimation with residual analysis. These detection techniques use only
instantaneous measurement data and require convergence of numerical solution.
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In this chapter, a new approach that utilizes both historical and instantaneous
measurement data is proposed to detect topology errors. The key idea is to track
the dynamics of the power flow measurements by forecasting the measurements.
Topology errors will cause the forecast measurements to be significantly differ-
ent from the actual measurements. To implement this approach, a time-forward
kriging-based load forecasting technique is used to forecast bus load for the next
time step. The forecast load is then converted to forecast state through power
flow analysis using network parameters stored at the control center. The fore-
cast measurements can be further calculated from the forecast state. Topology
errors can be detected by comparing the forecast and actual measurements. The
forecast measurement errors are used as input to train Support vector machine
(SVM) classifier oﬄine. Several common SVM kernel models are compared to
find the most suitable kernel for detecting topology errors. The SVM classifier
can be applied in real-time to detect a topology error. The proposed approach
is tested on IEEE 14 bus system with NYISO load data from Year 2011 and
2012. Our analysis shows that the proposed approach can accurately detect a
single-line topology error.
7.2 Introduction
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system collects two types
of measurement data from remote terminal units (RTUs), namely, analog and
digital data. Analog data generally includes power flow measurements in the
transmission lines, power injection to each bus, and voltage magnitude at each
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bus. Digital data includes on/off statuses of circuit breakers and switches. Ana-
log data provides the information on power flows in the network while digital
data provides the information on network topology. Accurate information of
both analog and digital data is important for reliable operation of the power
grid. This chapter focuses on errors in the digital data which are also known as
topology errors.
There are two types of topology errors in power systems [4]. The first type
is branch status errors which can be further classified into exclusion errors and
inclusion errors. Exclusion errors happen when a closed circuit breaker is consid-
ered as open. On the other hand, inclusion errors happen when an open circuit
breaker is considered as closed. Another type of topology errors is substation
configuration errors which refer to errors within a substation. This chapter fo-
cuses on branch status errors.
Situational unawareness caused by topology errors can cause large rolling black-
outs. The 2003 North American blackout was initiated by a transmission line
tripped as a result of a tree contact. The control center was not aware of this
situation and could not react to it in time [26]. The tripping of this transmis-
sion line caused other transmission lines to exceed their capacities thus leaded to
cascading failures. Incident report of the blackout points out that if the control
center was aware of the situation and had taken appropriate action earlier, the
total loss of load can be decreased significantly [26]. Reference [9] shows that
most blackouts are linked to communication problems. Although topology errors
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are rare, given the enormous impact of a potential blackout, it is important to
study how to detect topology errors in power systems.
In the literature, topology error detection methods can be divided into two main
groups, namely, post-estimation and pre-estimation [95, 96]. Post-estimation
methods detect topology errors from residual analysis and thus require converged
results from state estimation whereas pre-estimation methods verify topology
errors from raw measurement data. References [97, 98] are the pioneer works
of post-estimation methods that utilize the measurement residuals from the
state estimation. Reference [99] presents a method to improve the branch error
delectability of the measurement residual analysis. Pre-estimation method [100]
proposed a rule based algorithm to detect and identify topology errors. Sev-
eral power flow rules are checked in [100] to verify the circuit breaker statuses.
Another pre-estimation method [95] uses the unbalance indices, which are the
power mismatches between two nodes, together with support vector machine to
verify the power system topology.
Support vector machine is a classifier based on finding the maximum margin
between two groups of data. It can perform nonlinear classification by using
different kernel models. SVM has been widely used in power systems such as
voltage disturbance classification [101], fault location [102], etc. It is important
to select the proper kernel model and features for SVM classifier. For different
kernel models, there are different adjustable variables. In reference [95], unbal-
ance indices are used as inputs to SVM classifier to detect topology errors. In
130
Chapter 7. Topology Error Processing Based On Forecast Measurement Errors
this chapter, forecast measurement errors will be used as inputs to SVM classi-
fier. Two SVM classifiers are needed to verify the circuit breaker status of one
branch in [95]. Our approach requires only one SVM classifier to verify the circuit
breaker status of one branch. Details about the SVM kernel models, parameters
and feature selection will be discussed in section 7.3.
In this chapter a new pre-estimation approach is proposed to detect topology
errors. The proposed approach tracks the dynamics of power flow measurements
and forecasts them for the next time step. Power systems are considered as quasi-
static systems [40] where power flow changes constantly but slowly. RTU gathers
load and power flow measurements every few seconds while state estimation is
performed every few minutes [77]. Therefore, the forecast measurements can be
very accurate due to the slow variation rate and high measurement frequency.
Under normal operation with no topology error, the forecast measurements will
be close to the actual measurements. If the differences between the forecast and
actual measurements are significantly different from historical records, it may be
caused by topology errors. Support vector machine classifier is used as a tool to
detect and identify the topology errors. For each branch, there are two possible
scenarios: topology error and no topology error. SVM is trained from historical
data before it can be applied online.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.3 explains the formulation of
the forecasting technique and SVM classifier. Section 7.4 illustrates the impact
of topology errors on power systems using NYISO load data and IEEE 14 bus
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test system. Test results from different kernel models are shown in Section 7.5.
Conclusion is drawn in section 7.6.
7.3 Problem formulation
The proposed approach is shown in Fig. 7.1. The procedures in the flow chart
can be divided into forecasting step and topology error detection step. The
forecasting step forecasts the measurements for the time step k, after the time
step k− 1 and prior to the time step k. The vector of forecast measurements z˜k
is compared with the vector of the actual measurements zk. The vector of the
difference between forecast and actual measurements εk ≡ z˜k − zk is used as an















B. Topology Error Detection Step
Figure 7.1: The flow chart of the proposed topology error detection
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7.3.1 Forecasting step
The forecasting step forecasts measurements for the next time step. There are
two possible approaches: to forecast measurements directly or to forecast loads,
which will be converted to system states (voltage magnitude and phase) through
power flow analysis. In this chapter, we use the second approach which is to
forecast the bus load P˜Lk first. The forecast load can be converted to forecast
system state x˜k through power flow analysis using system configuration data
stored in the control center. The forecast measurement vector z˜k = hk(x˜k)
where hk is a vector function relating measurements to state variables at time
k. Although forecasting measurements directly is simpler, it has its limitations.
Forecasting loads can better handle scheduled system reconfiguration. Forecast-
ing measurements directly will be inaccurate under situations such as scheduled
circuit breaker open. For example, when a circuit breaker in line 1 is open for
scheduled maintenance, the power flow in the neighboring lines will be affected.
Under such scenarios, directly forecasting the measurements with data from the
previous system configuration will be inaccurate when this scheduled mainte-
nance happened. However, our approach can overcome this problem because of
the fact that the dynamic of electricity demand is relatively independent from
system structure. The maintenance information can be reflected during the load
to state power flow analysis.
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7.3.1.1 Load forecasting
The first step to get the forecast measurements z˜k is load forecasting. In the
literature, there are two types of load forecasting techniques, namely, Statistical
methods and Artificial Neural Network (ANN) methods [42]. In this chapter, an
empirical kriging based statistical method is used to forecast the bus load. Krig-
ing technique is used because it utilizes neighboring measurements to forecast
the target load. This feature of the kriging can help forecast load during partial
communication lost. In this chapter, no communication lost is considered thus
other load forecasting methods such as autoregressive integrated moving average
(ARIMA) can be used as well. For more details about the kriging method, please
refer to the references[49, 50, 74].
7.3.1.2 Convert System Load to System State
In this step, the forecast loads P˜Lk from the previous step will be converted to
the forecast states x˜k through power flow analysis. To perform the power flow
analysis, generator bus information (voltage magnitude and generation) is needed
[75]. In this chapter, we assume that the output of the generators increases at
the same ratio as the total load increases [40]. When the proposed approach is
applied in real power system, system operator can calculate the responses of the
generators from economic dispatch and automatic generation control.
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7.3.2 Topology Error Detection Step
Topology error detection step will be performed after actual measurements at
time step k, zk, arrived from remote terminal units. SVM classifier uses the
differences between forecast and actual measurements, εk, as inputs to detect
topology errors.
7.3.2.3 SVM
SVM is a pattern classifier that finds the maximum geometric margin between
two sets of training data S = {(x1, d1), . . . , (xN , dN )} where xi is an n-dimensional
vector, di = ±1. In our case, xi = εi, i = 1, . . . , k where k is the number of
training samples. We define di = −1 if there is no topology error, di = 1 other-
wise.










Txi + b)− 1 + ξi ≥ 0
ξi ≥ 0
135
Chapter 7. Topology Error Processing Based On Forecast Measurement Errors
Where (w, b) is the hyperplane, ξi is the nonnegative slack variable, C is the
cost of violating constraints. When C increases, the penalty for classification er-
rors increases. This will affect the orientation of the hyperplane. Inner-product
kernel K(x,xi) = ϕ
T (x)ϕ(xi) is used in SVM to better separate nonlinear in-
put classes. The three most commonly used kernels are listed in TABLE 7.1.
Kernel parameters affect the decision boundary significantly. For polynomial
Table 7.1: Common types of support vector machines inner-product kernels
Type K(x,xi)
Polynomial learning machine (xTxi + 1)
p





kernel, degree p determines the flexibility of the kernel. When p = 1, polynomial
kernel becomes a linear kernel. When p increases, the decision boundary of the
polynomial kernel model becomes more flexible thus can better classify nonlinear
data.
For radial basis function kernel, γ ≡ 1
2σ2
determines the decision boundary.
When γ is small, the decision boundary is nearly linear. When γ increases, the
decision boundary becomes more flexible. It is important to note that large γ
will lead to overfitting.
The Two-layer perceptron, also known as sigmoid kernel, is closely related to
neural networks. The two adjustable variables in the sigmoid kernel are the
slope β0 and the intercept β1. Reference [103] concludes that β0 > 0 and β1 < 0
is suitable for the sigmoid kernel.
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The standard method to find the optimal parameter is via grid-search [104]. For
polynomial kernel and radial basis kernel, the search space is two-dimensional,
which are (C, p) and (C, γ). The optimal parameters from the grid-search are
used for the SVM testing.
Apart from kernel types and kernel parameters, selecting the proper features is
important for SVM as well. The accuracy of the classifier will decrease with
too many features, especially when the size of the training sample is small [105].
Selecting the proper features can shorten the training time and improve the
classification accuracy. In power systems, the RTU analog measurements include
power flow, power injection and generator bus voltage magnitude. To reduce the
features dimension, the forecast measurement errors of real and reactive power
flows in the branches will be used for SVM. The reason of using forecasting errors
as SVM input will be explained latter in section 7.4.
For more details on support vector machine please refer to references [104, 106].
7.4 Case study
7.4.1 Test System Preparation
To test the proposed approach, three sets of data are needed; a system structure,
historical measurements with no topology error, and historical measurements
with topology errors. There are no such data sets directly available in the liter-
ature. In this chapter, we combine two openly accessible data sets to generate
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these three sets of data. In this chapter, IEEE 14 bus system, shown in Fig. 7.2,
is used as the test system. There are 11 load buses in the IEEE 14 bus system.
Figure 7.2: IEEE 14 bus test system
New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) has 11 regions load data with
five minutes interval. The data is available at http://www.nyiso.com. There
are 11 regions in NYISO, shown in Fig. 7.3. These 11 regions are mapped into
the 11 load buses of the IEEE 14 bus system. The load data from year 2011 and
2012 are used in this chapter.
Detail procedures to generate historical measurement data using IEEE 14 bus
system and NYISO load data are explained below.
1. Map the NYISO load to IEEE 14 bus using following matrix.
( 2 3 4 5 6 9 10 11 12 13 141 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 ) The first row is the IEEE 14 bus number. The
second row is the NYISO region number.
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Figure 7.3: NYISO map of 11 electric power grid regions in New York Stat,
USA
2. Normalize each NYISO load data to the initial value of the corresponding
IEEE 14 bus real and reactive power. Use the normalized NYISO real and
reactive power as the historical load for the IEEE 14 bus system. Due
to the lack of reactive load data, constant power factor is used in this
chapter. After the normalization, the IEEE 14 bus system has varying
operating states with the average load that is the same as the initial load.
3. Add up the real power load. Find the ratio of new total load over the initial
total load. Increase the generations with this ratio. The assumption used
here is that generators increase their output at the same ratio as the load
increases [40]. This assumption can be removed if generation schedules of
the generators are known.
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4. Run power flow analysis using the load and generator information with all
circuit breaker closed. Get the historical system state x0k.
5. Run the power flow analysis with the same load and generator data but
with a single branch open. Get the new system state xik where i = 1, . . . , 20.
i is the number id of the branch with circuit breaker open.
6. Get the historical measurement zik = h
i(xik) i = 0, . . . , 20 where h
i is the
corresponding system configuration when the circuit breaker of branch No.
i is open.
7. Add random measurement errors into the calculated measurements from
the last step with zero mean and following standard deviation (σvoltage =
0.004, σinjection = 0.01, σflow = 0.008 [76]).
7.4.2 Impact of System Reconfiguration on Line Flow
System reconfiguration will affect the power flow in the branches. When a circuit
breaker of a certain transmission line is open, the power flow in that transmission
line will become zero. If the power flow of that transmission line is measurable,
the measurement reading will become zero. This means that the topology errors
in measurable lines can be detected easily. If there exist unmeasurable lines
where power flow measurements are unavailable, this simple detection method
will not work. Since power grids are connected systems, an open status of a
circuit breaker will cause changes of power flows in the neighboring branches
which can be used to detect topology errors when the transmission line with
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topology error is unmeasurable. Fig. 7.4 shows the real power flow between
buses 2 & 5 with different system configurations. It clearly illustrates that power
flow of the neighboring branches will change when circuit breaker status toggles.
In Fig. 7.4, the real power flow between buses 2 & 5 with all circuit breakers
closed is represented with blue ‘o’ marker. When the transmission line between
buses 4 & 5 opens, the real power flow between buses 2 & 5 (red ‘x’ marker)
decreases. This phenomenon is reasonable because the flow between buses 2 & 5
are partially used to serve the load at bus 4. When the circuit breaker between
buses 4 & 5 is open, the load at bus 4 will be supplied more from the transmission
line between buses 2 & 4 which causes the decreasing of flow between buses 2 &
5.
On the contrary, when the transmission line between buses 2 & 3 is open (green
‘+’ marker in Fig. 7.4), the flow between buses 2 & 5 will increase. This is
because the load at bus 3 will be served through the transmission lines between
buses 2 & 5, 5 & 4 and 4 & 3, when the transmission line between buses 2 & 3
is open.
One thing to note is that the change of power flow in some lines may not be as
obvious as other lines. Fig. 7.5 shows the real power flow between buses 1 &
2. Compared with Fig. 7.4, a topology change has a relatively smaller impact
on the power flow between buses 1 & 2. This is due to the fact that the initial
power flow between buses 1 & 2 is very high.
Fig. 7.4 and Fig. 7.5 show that power flow in the transmission line will be
141
Chapter 7. Topology Error Processing Based On Forecast Measurement Errors
Figure 7.4: Real power flow between buses 2 & 5 for the first 8000 samples
of the April 2012 under different system configurations
affected by the statuses of the circuit breakers. However, in order to identify
the status of circuit breakers, power flow measurements are not suitable inputs
to SVM classifier. In Fig. 7.5, there are lots of overlapping of power flow mea-
surements under different circuit breaker status. This makes separating circuit
breakers statuses according to power flow measurements very difficult. To clas-
sify the circuit breakers statuses, a better choice of input variables for SVM is
needed. This chapter uses the differences between forecast measurements and
actual measurements as input variables. This approach can solve the problem of
overlapping of power flow measurements.
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Figure 7.5: Real power flow between buses 1 & 2 for the first 8000 samples
of the April 2012 under different system configurations
7.4.3 Impact of System Reconfiguration on Forecast Measure-
ments Errors
Kriging based load forecasting is the first step of our proposed approach. To
apply kriging on load forecasting, the time series load data must be detrended.
The trends of the load data include seasonal trend and weekly trend. Seasonal
trend is fitted using data from the previous year (2011). This seasonal trend is
then removed from the load data of the current year (2012). Weekly trend is
fitted using the three month data prior to the forecasting period. The average
value of the same day of the week and same time of the day is used as the
weekly trend. This approach can help to differentiate the load pattern between
weekdays and weekends.
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The forecast loads can be converted to forecast measurements using power flow
analysis. If there is no topology error, the forecast measurements for time step k
will be very close to the actual measurements at time k. Fig. 7.6 shows that the
forecast measurement errors are very close to zero, when there is no topology
error and all circuit breakers are closed. However, when topology error happens,
the forecast measurements for the next time step will be quite different from the
actual measurements. Fig. 7.4 shows that when the transmission line between
buses 4 & 5 is open, the real power flow between buses 2 & 5 will decrease. This
leads to the overestimation of real power flow as shown in Fig. 7.6.
Figure 7.6: Forecast error of real and reactive power flow between buses 2 & 5
for the first 8000 samples of the April 2012 under different system configurations
SVM will perform better by using the difference between forecast measurements
and actual measurements as input variables. Fig. 7.7 shows the forecast mea-
surement errors between buses 1 & 2. Compared with Fig. 7.5, which is the
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actual power flow measurements of the same line, Fig. 7.7 has a much clearer
classification.
Figure 7.7: Forecast error of real and reactive power flow between buses 1 & 2
for the first 8000 samples of the April 2012 under different system configurations
7.5 Results
The proposed approach is first tested on single-line unmeasurable scenarios. Un-
der these scenarios, only one transmission line is unmeasurable. The power flows
of the remaining transmission lines are assumed to be measurable. If a circuit
breaker status of a measurable line is changed, the system will detect the system
reconfiguration directly from the measurement reading. To train the SVM for a
specific unmeasurable line, two sets of power flow measurements data from the
neighboring lines are used. The first set is the power flow measurements with
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all circuit breakers closed. The second set is the power flow measurements with
the circuit breaker of the unmeasurable transmission line open. The single-line
unmeasurable scenario has been tested on all the transmission lines of IEEE 14
bus system except lines between buses 1 & 2 and 7 & 8, because the outage of
these two lines will cause the power flow to diverge.
To find the most suitable kernel model for the SVM classifier, several kernel
models have been tested. For each kernel model, the classification accuracy from
different parameters is compared.
7.5.1 Linear Kernel
According to Fig. 7.6 and Fig. 7.7, our initial guess is that a linear kernel SVM
classifier may be suitable for the problem. The adjustable parameter in the
linear kernel is C. TABLE 7.2 shows the accuracy of topology error detection
with branch No. 2 (between buses 1 & 5) being unmeasurable. The training
samples for detecting topology error in branch No. 2 are the first 8000 samples
from April. The trained classifier is tested on the remaining 71200 samples after
the training sample in Year 2012.The left three columns in TABLE 7.2 represent
the classification results when circuit breaker in branch No. 2 is closed. The
first and second column is the number of samples that are classified as closed
and open when the circuit breaker in branch No. 2 is actually closed. The
third column is the classification accuracy for the classifier. Column four to six
are classification results when circuit breaker in branch No. 2 is actually open.
The seventh column indicates the value of C. Four different C values have been
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tested. All C values are suitable for the application. The same test has been
applied on the remaining 17 transmission lines. Results from the other lines are
consistent with the result from branch No. 2. For the branch No. 19, which
connects buses 12 & 13, a high value of C is not suitable. This is because the
impact of topology change on forecast measurement error of branch No. 19 is
very small. C = 0.1 should be used to detect topology error in branch No. 19.
Table 7.2: Branch No. 2 unmeasurable test using linear kernel with different
C. Trained from the first 8000 samples of April. Tested on the 71200 samples
after the training samples in Year 2012
Branch No. 2 Closed Branch No. 2 Open
C
Closed Open Accuracy Closed Open Accuracy
71200 0 100.000% 0 71200 100.000% 0.1
71200 0 100.000% 0 71200 100.000% 1
71200 0 100.000% 0 71200 100.000% 10
71200 0 100.000% 0 71200 100.000% 100
TABLE 7.3 shows the performance of using linear kernel to detect topology
error for all the transmission lines. Result shows that the proposed approach is
generally accurate to detect topology errors.
7.5.2 Polynomial Kernel
Polynomial kernel based SVM is tested after the linear kernel. Two variables C
and p are adjustable for polynomial kernel. TABLE 7.4 shows the result from
branch No. 2 unmeasurable scenario. From the TABLE 7.4, we can see that
p = 3 gives the best results.
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Table 7.3: Single-line unmeasurable testing result using linear kernel with
C = 0.1. Trained from the first 8000 samples of April. Tested on the 71200
samples after the training samples in Year 2012. First column is the unmea-
surable branch No.
No.
Branch Closed Branch Open
Closed Open Accuracy Closed Open Accuracy
2 71200 0 100.000% 0 71200 100.000%
3 71200 0 100.000% 0 71200 100.000%
4 71200 0 100.000% 0 71200 100.000%
5 71200 0 100.000% 0 71200 100.000%
6 71200 0 100.000% 0 71200 100.000%
7 71200 0 100.000% 0 71200 100.000%
8 71200 0 100.000% 0 71200 100.000%
9 71200 0 100.000% 0 71200 100.000%
10 71200 0 100.000% 0 71200 100.000%
11 71199 1 99.999% 49 71151 99.931%
12 71200 0 100.000% 1 71199 99.999%
13 71200 0 100.000% 1 71199 99.999%
15 71200 0 100.000% 0 71200 100.000%
16 71199 1 99.999% 227 70973 99.681%
17 71200 0 100.000% 0 71200 100.000%
18 71199 1 99.999% 4 71196 99.994%
19 71200 0 100.000% 7363 63837 89.659%
20 71199 1 99.999% 0 71200 100.000%
Table 7.4: Branch No. 2 unmeasurable test using polynomial kernel with
different C and p. Trained from the first 8000 samples from April. Tested on
the 71200 samples after the training samples in Year 2012
Branch No. 2 Closed Branch No. 2 Open
C p
Closed Open Accuracy Closed Open Accuracy
71200 0 100% 1298 69902 98% 0.1 2
71200 0 100% 0 71200 100% 0.1 3
71200 0 100% 34260 36940 52% 0.1 10
71200 0 100% 1298 69902 98% 1 2
71200 0 100% 0 71200 100% 1 3
71200 0 100% 34260 36940 52% 1 10
71200 0 100% 1298 69902 98% 10 2
71200 0 100% 0 71200 100% 10 3
71200 0 100% 34260 36940 52% 10 10
71200 0 100% 1298 69902 98% 100 2
71200 0 100% 0 71200 100% 100 3
71200 0 100% 34260 36940 52% 100 10
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7.5.3 Radial-Basis Function Kernel
Two variable C and σ are adjustable for radial-basis function kernel SVM. TA-
BLE 7.5 shows that σ = 10 is suitable for our application.
Table 7.5: Branch No. 2 unmeasurable test using radial-basis function kernel
with different C and σ. Trained from the first 8000 samples of April. Tested
on the 71200 samples after the training samples in Year 2012
Branch No. 2 Closed Branch No. 2 Open
C σ
Closed Open Accuracy Closed Open Accuracy
71197 3 99.996% 0 71200 100% 0.1 1
71200 0 100.000% 0 71200 100% 0.1 10
71197 3 99.996% 0 71200 100% 1 1
71200 0 100.000% 0 71200 100% 1 10
71197 3 99.996% 0 71200 100% 10 1
71200 0 100.000% 0 71200 100% 10 10
71197 3 99.996% 0 71200 100% 100 1
71200 0 100.000% 0 71200 100% 100 10
Comparing all these three kernels, a simple linear kernel is good enough for
detecting topology error. This is consistent with Fig. 7.6 and 7.7 where different
classes can be separated visually through a straight linear line.
7.6 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a new approach to detect topology errors based on
measurement forecast with support vector machine classifier. The proposed ap-
proach utilizes the historical data to classify unmeasurable line statuses. The key
idea is that topology errors will increase the forecast measurement errors in the
neighboring lines of the unmeasurable line. These forecast measurement errors
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are used as input for SVM classifier. Test results from single-line unmeasurable
scenarios show a promising performance of the proposed approach.
SVM classifier usually classifies two classes. Compared with single-line unmea-
surable scenarios, multiple-line unmeasurable scenarios require extra data set for
SVM to identify the transmission lines with topology errors. For example, if lines
m and n are unmeasurable, two classifiers are needed. To train the classifier for
line m, only circuit breaker in line m open is classified as line m open. If the
circuit breaker from other lines are open, it is still classified as line m is closed.
Apart from multiple SVM classifiers, another possible future solution of detecting
topology errors with multiple-line unmearuable is using a multiclass classifier.
ANN methods may be used in the future for classifying multiple classes.
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A game theoretic approach to
power system security
8.1 Overview
The security of the electrical power grid is crucial to any country’s economy.
Modern power grids are facing an increasing amount of threats from hostile
attacks (both physical and cyber-attacks). Hence, protecting the power grid,
including generators, substations, and transmission lines, is a critical task. This
chapter studies how to optimally allocate defense resources to protect the power
grid against hostile attacks. We take a two-step approach to find the best defense
strategy. The first step is to quantify the impact of the attack on generators. We
quantify generator failure on loss of load using DC optimal power flow (DCOPF).
In the second step, the quantified loss of load is used as the payoff to the attacker.
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This leads to a zero-sum game which is used to calculate the optimal defense
strategy for the system operator. However, to accurately quantify the impact of
an attack, one needs the system configuration information, which the attacker
may not have. In this scenario, we assume that the attacker can only estimate
its payoff based on the generator characteristics. From the analysis, we propose
an optimal defense strategy for the system operator to protect the power grid.
The proposed technique has been tested on IEEE Reliability Test System - 1996
(RTS-96) and the results demonstrate the advantages of the proposed technique
over naive strategies.
8.2 Introduction
The security of the electrical power grid is crucial for reliable operation of the
gird. Recent events show that current power grids are not 100% secure. The
2003 North American blackout affected an area with an estimated 50 million
people and 61,800 megawatts (MW) of electric load [26]. On April 2015, Wash-
ington D.C. was hit with a power outage which affected the White House. It
is believed that this incident is due to a small explosion at a power plant in
southern Maryland [107].
Although these two events are not terror-related, power grids are still facing
increasing amount of attacks. These attacks, physical or cyber, can cause sig-
nificant impacts to the grid. Physical attacks on the power grid, which are
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characterized as the attacks that destroy infrastructures (e.g., generators, trans-
mission lines etc.) and disrupt the power supply. Research in [108] studies how
to identify the critical physical components of the power grid. On the other
hand, cyber attacks on the power grid refer to attacks on the supervisory con-
trol and data acquisition (SCADA) system. The SCADA system in the power
grid monitors and controls the operation of the entire grid. If the attacker can
penetrate the SCADA system, the consequences can be devastating. Stuxnet, a
computer worm, reportedly destroyed almost a fifth of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges
[109]. Since both physical and cyber attacks can cause significant loss to the
power grid, it is important to study how to defend against these attacks.
As the system operator, one of the major tasks is to efficiently allocate defense
resources on the power grid to protect the power grid from various attacks.
Defense resources can include security personnels dealing with physical attacks
and network security officers dealing with cyber attacks. However, due to the
limited defense resources of the system operator, it is usually impossible or very
costly to allocate defense resources throughout the network. Thus, estimating
the behaviors of the attackers and strategically allocating defense resources are
important for most of the power grids in the real world. During a power grid
attack, the attacker will adjust the attack strategy in order to maximize the
damage to the power grid. On the other hand, the system operator will adjust
the defense strategy in order to minimize the damage to the system. Because of
this kind of interaction between the attacker and the system operator, studies
of system security usually model the problem as a game situation rather than
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a decision situation. In this chapter, we will use game theory [110] as the tool
to investigate the optimal attack and defense strategies for the attacker and the
system operator respectively.
A game is a precise description of the strategic interaction that includes the con-
straints of, and payoffs for, actions that the players can take, but says nothing
about what actions they actually take [110]. Game theory is the formal of com-
petition and cooperation in a multiuser environment. It has been widely applied
to social sciences, philosophy, biology, wireless networks, and security systems
[111, 112]. In short, interaction between users (or players) is modeled as a game,
in which the outcomes of a decision process is affected by player actions. The
games can be cooperative or non-cooperative in nature [113].
Smart grid systems are complex systems which incorporate sophisticated power
system technology and advanced communications, control and computing strate-
gies. In these systems, a game theoretic approach has been applied to understand
and analyze the basic problems that come up [114]. One application of game
theory in this context is to microgrid control, energy distribution and cooper-
ation, demand-side management, and reliable smartgrid communications. For
more details, see [114] and the references therein.
Game theory has been widely applied by researchers to solve security problems
in various systems in the literature. In [115], the authors construct a two-player
stochastic game to model the interactions between the attacker and the system
administrator in order to analyze the security of a computer network. Using
nonlinear programming, they solve the Nash equilibria, which gives the best
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response strategies or both the attacker and the system administrator. Alpcan
et al. in [116] formulate multiple types of game based on various information
availability assumptions to address the security problem in vehicular networks.
The resulting strategies help locating the most valuable or vulnerable points in
vehicular networks, which can help network operators to optimize the defense
resources.
Game theory has been widely applied by researchers to solve security problems
in various systems in the literature. Several attack and defense strategies in
smart grid communication networks are presented in [117]. A zero-sum game is
used to model the jamming in communication channel by Basar and Kashyap
[118]. In [119], the authors study several security problems of vehicular networks
as zero-sum games. However, research on power system security is still lacking.
In this chapter, we take an approach on game theory to increase the security of
power grids.
A rich set of tools has been developed within game theory to address problems
where multiple players with different objectives compete and interact with each
other on the same system. The multi-player decision scenarios are described
as games where each player chooses actions that will result in the best possible
rewards for self, while anticipating the rational actions from other players [120].
In this chapter, we take a two-step approach to find the optimal defense strategy
for the power grid operator. The first step is to quantify the impact of attack
on the power grid. To achieve this, we propose to use DC optimal power flow
to calculate the loss of load (load demand not served) when the generator is
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under attack. Since modern power grids are complex interconnected systems, an
attack on one component of the grid may cause a harmful cascading effect on the
rest of the grid. The proposed method combines relaxed DCOPF from [34] and
cascading analysis in power system blackout research[35]. It incorporates grid
configuration information and limitations, and is capable of simulating cascading
effects by using the fast transit part of the OPA method [36, 37], which is widely
used in blackout research.
In the second step, we propose to use a zero-sum game to calculate the best
defense strategy. The quantified loss of load from the first step is used as the
payoff for the zero-sum game. However, to accurately calculate the loss of load,
one needs the information of the grid configuration which the attacker may not
have. For this scenario, we assume that the attacker can only estimate its payoff
based on the generator characteristics. From the analysis, we propose an optimal
defense strategy for the system operator to protect the power grid. The proposed
technique has been tested on IEEE Reliability Test System - 1996 (RTS-96).
Compared with naive strategies, the proposed technique demonstrate significant
advantages.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 8.3 describes the mathe-
matical formulation of our proposed technique. Section 8.4 reports the test result
of our proposed technique on RTS-96 system with different scenarios. Conclu-
sions are drawn in Section 8.5
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8.3 Problem formulation
This section discusses the mathematical formulation of our proposed technique
to find the optimal defense strategy for power system operator. Our approach
includes methods to quantify the loss of load caused by the attack and game
game theoretic formulation. In this section, we will explain these two in detail.
8.3.1 Quantify loss of load
Modern power grids are equipped with the SCADA system that serves the func-
tion of monitoring and controlling the grid. During an emergency, such as genera-
tor failure, the SCADA system replaces the passive automatic load shedding with
intelligent load shedding (ILS). Passive load shedding relies on under voltage[29]
or under frequency [30] relay. ILS uses information from RTUs to make more
accurate and optimal load shedding strategy [31–33].
8.3.1.1 Assumption
In this chapter, we assume that the generator that is under attack will be immedi-
ately disconnected from the grid. The remaining generators can instantaneously
increase generation with limited amount.
8.3.1.2 Process flow
We propose to calculate the minimum loss of load using the flow chart summa-
rized in Fig. 8.1. It includes relaxed DCOPF from research [34] and cascading
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analysis in blackout research[35]. This proposed approach can simulate the cas-
cading effect by using fast transit part of OPA method[36, 37].
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3. Relax transmission and generation constraints.
Add a high cost for over generation and






7. This is the
optimal loss of load
Figure 8.1: Flow Chart to Find Optimal Loss of Load
In Phase 1, we take the constraints of the power grid into considerations. These
constraints are transmission lines capacity and generators capacity.
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(Di − Pi) (8.1)
where Di and Pi stand for demands and injected power at bus i; Lj is the loss
of load caused by attacking generator j. The DCOPF is subjected to generators
constraint and transmission lines constraint set in Phase 1.
Based on the result from Phase 2, if there is no feasible solution from the DCOPF,
we will relax the constraints of the generators and transmission lines. Penalties
for exceeding these constraints are added to formulate a new objective function.




(Di − Pi) + wp ×
∑
i,j




where Efij and E
G
i stand for excessive flow and generation, respectively; wp is
the penalty for exceed the limit.
From the result of Phase 3, we will disconnect the most overloaded transmission
line or generator. This step simulates the cascading effect of blackout.
After removing the overloaded transmission line or generator, we run the DCOPF
in Phase 2 again without relaxing the constraints. If there still is no feasible
solution, we run Phase 3-6 again. If there is a feasible solution, this solution is
the minimum load shedding.
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8.3.2 Power System Security Game Model
The power grid security games in this chapter are finite, two-player (attacker
versus defender) and zero-sum games. The action space of the players is the
collection of alternative moves available to the player, which is to either attack
or defend a specific region of the power grid. As an example for the defined
security game, an attacker attacks one region of the power system with some
probability according to its attack strategy. In response, the defender allocates
defense resources to the same or another region according to its own strategy.
The outcome of a specific game is determined by the game matrix, which contains
the cost (payoff) values for each possible action-reaction combination. The size
of the game matrix will be N times N , where N is the total number of regions
(nodes) in the power grid.
The game matrix maps player actions (attack or defend) on the locations within
the power system to outcomes, payoff, and cost, for the attacker and defender,
respectively. The game matrix entries depend on how the attack and defender
move in the game. The off-diagonal entries represent the cases when the attacker
attacks a node which is not defended by the defender, which means the attacker
is not captured by the defender. In such cases, the off-diagonal entries will be
assumed to be the loss of load (positive). The diagonal entries represent the cases
when the attacker attacks a node which is defended by the defender, which means
the attacker is captured by the defender. In such cases, the diagonal entries will
be a penalty index multiplied by the amount of loss of load (negative). For the
rest of the chapter, the convention is adopted where the attacker is the row player
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(maximizer) and the defender is the column player (minimizer). Accordingly, the
game matrix M is defined in (8.3):
M = [M(i, j)] :=

Li, if i 6= j,
−1 ∗ r ∗ Li, if i = j
(8.3)
where i, j = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N represent the region that the attacker choose to attack
and defender choose to defend; r is the penalty index set by the law.
8.3.3 Zero-Sum Game
We formulate a zero-sum game to model the interaction between the system
operator and the attacker. In zero-sum games, the attacker’s gain is equal to the
defender’s loss. The zero-sum game has the matrix defined in (8.3) and follows
the conventions that the attacker is the maximizer (row player) and the defender
is the minimizer (column player) of the game. Every such two-player zero-sum
matrix game admits a solution in mixed strategies and the solution (saddle point)






M(i, j)xi ≥ v,∀j ∈ Nr,
∑
i
xi = 1,xi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ Nr,
(8.4)
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M(i, j)yi ≥ w,∀i ∈ Nr,
∑
i
yi = 1,yi ≥ 0,∀j ∈ Nr,
(8.5)
The objective of the attacker is formulated in (8.4) showing that the attacker
is trying to maximize the damage (loss of load) to the power grid; whereas the
objective of the system operator is to minimize the damage to the power grid,
as formulated in (8.5). In (8.4) and (8.5), the vector x is the attack strategy
indicating the attack probabilities on different regions of the power grid. One
the other hand, the vector y is the defense strategy indicating where to allocate
the defense resources. Nr are the attack and defense regions.
Since both problems are feasible and mutually dual, by duality theory, the max-
imum of v will be equal to the minimum of w. Hence, the value v = w is the
value of the game, which corresponds to the equilibrium (saddle point) gain and
loss for the attacker and defender, respectively.
8.4 Case Study
In this section, we present a case study for two scenarios.
For the first scenario, we assume that the attacker can accurately calculate the
loss of load caused by the attack. This loss of load is then used as the payoff
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for the attacker to formulate a zero-sum game. The Nash equilibrium from the
zero-sum game leads to the optimal defense and attack strategy.
In order to calculate the loss of load, the attacker needs the information of
the grid configuration, which the attacker may not have. Thus, for the second
scenario, we assume that the attacker can only estimate its payoff based on the
generator characteristics.
8.4.1 Test System
IEEE Reliability Test System - 1996 (RTS-96) is used for the case study. In
RTS-96, there are 73 buses and 33 generators. In the case study, we follow the
load demand and transmission line capacity from the RTS-96. However, RTS-
96 does not specify when a generator is disconnected from the grid, how much
the remaining generators can instantly increase generations. In the case study
we assume that during such emergency, the remaining generators can instantly
increase generations by 1% and 5%.
8.4.2 Naive Strategy
In the following case study, we will compare our proposed approach against two
naive attack and defense strategies. The first naive strategy is to attack or
defense all regions with same probability. The second naive strategy allocates
attack or defense resources proportional to the impact of attack. We find that
if the attacker uses such strategies, the defender will have an advantage and be
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able to better defend the grid. These naive strategies are not optimal but we use
it as a benchmark to understand the performance of our proposed approach.
If the defender knows the naive attack strategy, the best defense strategy is
to protect the generator with highest expected impact. Mathematically, let Li
represents the loss of load caused by attacking generator i without defending it,
xi represents the attack probability at generator i. The best defend strategy yi
should minimize (8.6). Since Li and xi are known to the defender, yi ≥ 0 and∑
yi = 1, the best defense strategy is to set yi = 1 where Li ∗ xi is the largest.
∑
Li ∗ xi ∗ (1− yi) =
∑
Li ∗ xi −
∑
Li ∗ xi ∗ yi (8.6)
8.4.3 First Scenario
In this first scenario, we assume that the attacker can calculate the loss of load
caused by the attack.
8.4.3.1 Quantify Loss of Load
To find the optimal defense strategy for this scenario, the first step is to calculate
the loss of load when a generator is suddenly disconnected from the grid. TA-
BLE 8.1 summarizes the results from attacking on the RTS-96. There are three
columns in TABLE 8.1. The first column indicates which generator is under
attack. The second and third columns show the loss of load caused by the attack
when the remaining generators can instantly increase generation by 1% and 5%.
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Table 8.1: Loss of load when one generator is attacked (100MW)
Generator No. 1% 5% Generator No. 1% 5%
1 0 0 18 0 0
2 0 0 19 0.738 0
3 0.129 0 20 0.732 0
4 0 0 21 0.389 0
5 0 0 22 3.196 1.105
6 0 0 23 0.956 0
7 0 0 24 0.961 0
8 0.938 0 25 1.527 0
9 0.996 0 26 1.664 0.001
10 0.549 0 27 0 0
11 2.016 0 28 0.632 0
12 0.239 0 29 0.480 0
13 0.267 0 30 2.246 0.498
14 0.593 0 31 2.302 0.551
15 0.757 0 32 1.544 0
16 0 0 33 4.289 2.562
17 0 0
TABLE 8.1 shows that attacking different generators will have very different
impacts. For example, attacking the fist generator will cause no loss of load,
meaning that the remaining generators can serve the electricity demands. How-
ever, attacking generator number 33 will cause near 429MW loss of load when
the remaining generators can instantly increase 1%. Thus finding a good defense
strategy is a critical task.
8.4.3.2 Zero-Sum Game
In this chapter, we propose to formulate a zero-sum game to find the optimal
defense strategy. As explained in the previous section, in a zero-sum game, the
two players, attacker and defender know each others’ payoff. In this chapter, the
payoff for the attacker for a successful attack without getting caught is equal to
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the loss of load caused by the attack. Thus the off diagonal in the payoff matrix
M is the loss of load. The diagonal of M is the penalty when the attacker is
caught. In this case study, the penalty is computed by multiplying a penalty
index r to the loss of load. The formulated zero-sum game is then solved using
linear programing. The results from the zero-sum game are shown below.
8.4.3.3 Increase penalty
The value of the game v for the attacker decreases when penalty index r increases.
This is rational, since, as the penalty increases, the attacker will lose more when
get caught but will not gain more when the attack is successful. Thus the overall
value of the game for the attacker decreases.


























1% Naive Attack S1
1% Naive Attack S2
5%
5% Naive Attack S1
5% Naive Attack S2
Figure 8.2: Value of the game when attacker uses different attack strategies
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The results from the case study are shown in Fig. 8.2 with six curves, two for the
zero-sum game and four for the naive attack strategy. For the zero-sum game,
we compare the value of the game at different penalty index values. For both
situations where generators can instantly increase generation by 1% and 5%, the
value of the game decreases for the attacker when the penalty index increases.
An interesting result is that at 5% situation, when penalty index is larger than
three, the value of the game equals zero. This is because at such high penalty,
the rational attacker will choose to attack generators with zero payoff which is
equal to choose not to attack.
Fig. 8.2 also shows the results from the naive attack strategies. Comparing the
naive strategy with strategy from zero-sum game, it is clear that that strategy
from zero-sum game have a higher value for the attacker for both the 1% and
5% situations. Comparing the two naive strategies S1 (evenly attack) and S2
(proportional to the impact), we find that when penalty index is small, S2 is
better than S1 for the attacker.
Similarly, if the defender uses naive defense strategies, the attacker will gain.
Fig. 8.3 shows the value of the game when defender evenly allocates the defense
resource at all generators. This will lead to a higher value of the game for the
attacker. From Fig. 8.2 and Fig. 8.3, we can see that the optimal strategy for
both attacker and defender is the Nash equilibrium from the zero-sum game.
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1% Naive Defense S1
1% Naive Defense S2
5%
5% Naive Defense S1
5% Naive Defense S2
Figure 8.3: Value of the game when defender uses different defense strategies
8.4.3.4 Optimal Strategies
Apart form the value of the game, another interesting observation is that when
penalty index is small, the attacker focuses on attacking the highest payoff gen-
erators. But when the penalty index increases, the attacker spreads its attacking
strategy. Figure 8.4 shows how the attacker’s action space (number of generators
that the attack will attack) changes according to the penalty index. From the
figure, we can see that if the attacker gets no penalty for being caught, attacker
will attack only four generators for the 1 % and two generators for the 5 % sit-
uation. But when the penalty index increases, the attacker will try to spread to
attack more generators.
Figures 8.5, 8.6, 8.7 and 8.8 show the Nash equilibrium for the attacker and the
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Figure 8.4: Number of generators the attacker will attack at different penalty
index when the remaining generators can increase generation by 1% and 5%
defender. From these four figures, we can see that for the attacker, if the penalty
index is small, the attacker will focus on attacking generator number 22, 30, 31
and 33. When the penalty index increases, the attacker moves its attack strategy
to the smaller payoff generators. When we look together with TABLE 8.1, it is
clear that attacking generator number 22, 30, 31 and 33 will cause higher loss of
load. when the penalty is high, it becomes too risky for the attacker to attack
the high impact generators.
For the defender (system operator), when the penalty index is small or it is
difficult to catch the attacker, the defender should focus on generator 22 and
33 which have the highest importance. When the penalty index increase, the
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Figure 8.5: Optimal Attack Strategy when the remaining generator can in-
crease generations by 1%
8.4.4 Second Scenario
In the second scenario, we assume that the attacker can not calculate the exact
loss of load. Instead, the attacker will have to estimate the loss of load. This is
more realistic as calculating the exact loss of load requires full knowledge of the
power grid configuration which is difficult to obtain for the attacker.
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Figure 8.6: Optimal Attack Strategy when the remaining generator can in-
crease generations by 5%
8.4.4.1 Strategy for the attacker
To find the best defense strategy, we first calculate the attack strategy. From the
attacker’s point of view, the best attack strategy is obtained using the zero-sum
game based on the estimated loss of load. Thus, the attacker’s strategy depends
on how accurate the attacker can estimate the loss of load. In this chapter, we
assume that the attacker estimates the loss of load solely based on the generation
plant size.
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Figure 8.7: Optimal Defense Strategy when the remaining generators can
increase generations by 1%
8.4.4.2 Strategy for the defender
In the second scenario, the defender has an advantage over the attacker at cal-
culating the loss of load. Once the defender can find the attacker’s strategy, it is
similar to defend against a naive attack strategy. Thus the best defense strategy
is to protect the generator with the highest expected loss of load.
To simulate this scenario, we use the exact generation value with Gaussian error
as the payoff for the attacker. The actual generation from the generator is used
as the mean of the Gaussian distribution. In the case study, we have tested
different error standard deviations, from 0 to 50% of the mean. Test results are
summarized in Fig 8.9 and 8.10. Both figures show that the expected loss of load
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Figure 8.8: Optimal Defense Strategy when the remaining generators can
increase generations by 5%
decreases when estimation error increase. This means that although generation
value is not the exact loss of load, estimating the generation more accurately will
help the attacker to get more loss of load.
8.4.5 First vs Second Scenario
The difference between the first and the second scenarios is whether the attacker
can calculate the loss of load or not. In order to calculate the loss of load, the
attacker needs the information of the grid configuration which is very difficult to
get. However, under both scenarios, the defender can calculate the loss of load.
This gives the defender an advantage over the attacker in the second scenario.
Fig. 8.11 compares the value of the game between the first and second scenarios.
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Figure 8.9: Expected loss of load with 1% extra generation


















Figure 8.10: Expected loss of load with 5% extra generation
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It is clear that the value of the game decreases in the second scenario, which is
good for the defender.




























Figure 8.11: Value of the game for the attacker at different penalty index
8.5 Summary
In this chapter, a new technique is proposed to find the best defense strategy
for the power system operator against attacks on the power grid. We have
considered two scenarios where the attacker can and cannot calculate the loss of
load caused by the attack. Results show that increasing the penalty of getting
caught will affect the strategy of the attacker. Thus the defender should also
adjust the defense strategy according to the penalty index. Results also show
advantages of the proposed technique over naive strategies, in which attack and
defense resources are allocated evenly.
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Conclusion and Future Work
9.1 Thesis Conclusion
Cyber security is a rising concern in modern power grids. Cyber-attacks on power
grids affect the reliability of the grid operation. In this thesis, a framework is
proposed and built to understand and analyze the cyber security of power grids.
A literature review in chapter 2 covers the information system and potential
cyber-attacks on power grids. This literature review offers a clear picture of the
latest development on the cyber security issues of modern power grids.
Following the literature review, a new method is proposed to quantify the impact
of communication failure on monitoring and controlling of the power grid. For
the monitoring function, it is found that communication failure could make the
power grid unobservable. For the controlling function, communication failure
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could cause extra loss of load. Based on the impact analysis, suggestions are
provided to optimally improve the grid security.
After the impact analysis, four mitigation methods are proposed to defend
against cyber-attacks on the power grid. The first mitigation method is fo-
cused on load forecasting under different communication scenarios, including
fully operational and multiple failures. The proposed approach has been tested
on NYISO five-minute (very short-term) and PJM hourly (short term) load data
for 2012 and 2013. Test results show that the proposed approach is capable
of forecasting load under communication failure with acceptable accuracy and
improved accuracy when compared with other forecasting techniques.
The second mitigation method is for state estimation under communication fail-
ure. The proposed approach has been tested with various communication failure
scenarios. Result shows that the proposed DSE approach is more accurate than
traditional weighted least square state estimation with and without communica-
tion failure. The proposed approach is also faster than the traditional WLS.
The third mitigation method is for detecting false data injection attacks. A
new detection method is proposed to detect false data injection attacks. The
proposed method has been tested using various attacking scenarios. Test results
show that the proposed method can accurately detect most of the attacks. The
proposed method is also capable of detecting false data injection attacks that
replace the current measurement with previous measurements, which cannot be
detected using any existing methods.
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The fourth mitigation method is to detect topology errors. A new approach is
proposed in the thesis. The proposed approach is based on measurement forecast
and support vector machine classifier. It has been tested on IEEE 14 bus system
with NYISO load data from 2011 and 2012. Results show that the proposed
approach can accurately detect a single-line topology error.
After the mitigation methods, this thesis looks into a mitigation strategy which
combines the impact analysis and mitigation methods. The mitigation strategy
focus on allocating the defense resources against potential cyber-attacks on the
power grid. Due to the limited defense resources of the system operator, it is
usually not possible or efficient to allocate defense resources evenly throughout
the network. The proposed method finds the optimal defense strategy.
9.2 Future Work
Information system transforms the power grid into a more efficient and intelligent
grid. However, current power grids are not secure against cyber-attacks. In this
thesis, several methods are proposed to improve the cyber security of power
grids. However, more work is needed to make power grids more secure.
Apart from the methods proposed in this thesis, it is possible to develop other
methods to counter the data availability attacks. One potential method is to pri-
oritize certain critical information. For example, in the state estimation, certain
data in more important than others. How to better protect these critical data
is an interesting research topic. Another potential method to counter the data
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availability attacks is to rearrange information transmission so that it is more
resilient to packet loss.
As for the data integrity attacks, the methods proposed in this thesis can be
further improved. In the chapter that detects false data injection attacks, the
proposed method cannot detection attacks when the injected error is very small.
In the topology error detection chapter, the proposed method can detect the
existence of topology error but cannot identify the exact location of the topology
error. More work is needed to improve these methods.
For the mitigation strategy analysis, the current defense model is relatively sim-
ple. It can be further developed into a more sophisticate and realistic model.
The mitigation strategy analysis also assumes that the attacker is rational. A
new method is needed if the attacker is non-rational.





1. Chaojun Gu, Dazhi Yang, P. Jirutitijaroen, W.M. Walsh, and T. Reindl.
Spatial Load Forecasting With Communication Failure Using Time-Forward
Kriging. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 29(6):28752882, November 2014.
2. Chaojun Gu and P. Jirutitijaroen. Dynamic State Estimation Under Com-
munication Failure Using Kriging Based Bus Load Forecasting. IEEE Transac-
tions on Power Systems, PP(99):110, 2015.
3. Chaojun Gu, P. Jirutitijaroen, and M. Motani. Detecting False Data In-
jection Attacks in AC State Estimation. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,
PP(99):11, 2015
4. Dazhi Yang, Chaojun Gu, Zibo Dong, Panida Jirutitijaroen, Nan Chen, and
Wilfred M. Walsh. Solar irradiance forecasting using spatial-temporal covariance
structures and time-forward kriging. Renewable Energy, 60:235245, December
2013.
5. Chaojun Gu, C. Zhou, and M. Motani. A Game Theoretic Approach To
Power System Security. manuscript submitted.
Conference:
1. Chaojun Gu and P. Jirutitijaroen. Impacts of communication failure
on power system operations. In Power and Energy Engineering Conference
(APPEEC), 2013 IEEE PES Asia-Pacific, pages 15, December 2013
2. Chaojun Gu and P. Jirutitijaroen. Topology error processing based on fore-
cast measurement errors. In Power Systems Computation Conference (PSCC),
2014, pages 17, August 2014.
180
Bibliography
[1] C. H Hauser, D. E Bakken, and A. Bose. A failure to communicate: next
generation communication requirements, technologies, and architecture for
the electric power grid. IEEE Power and Energy Magazine, 3(2):47– 55,
April 2005. ISSN 1540-7977. doi: 10.1109/MPAE.2005.1405870.
[2] C. Singh and A. Sprintson. Reliability assurance of cyber-physical power
systems. In 2010 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, pages
1–6. IEEE, July 2010. ISBN 978-1-4244-6549-1. doi: 10.1109/PES.2010.
5590189.
[3] Steven W. Blume. SYSTEM CONTROL CENTERS AND TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS. In Electric Power System Basics. John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ, USA, September 2007. ISBN 9780470185810,
9780470129876.
[4] Ali Abur and Antonio Gmez Expsito. Power System State Estimation:
Theory and Implementation. CRC Press, 1 edition, March 2004. ISBN
0824755707.
[5] A. Monticelli. State Estimation in Electric Power Systems: A Generalized
Approach. Springer, May 1999. ISBN 9780792385196.
[6] Yao Liu, Peng Ning, and Michael K. Reiter. False data injection attacks
against state estimation in electric power grids. In Proceedings of the 16th
ACM conference on Computer and communications security, CCS ’09,
page 21C32, New York, NY, USA, 2009. ACM. ISBN 978-1-60558-894-




[7] F. Cleveland. Enhancing the reliability and security of the information
infrastructure used to manage the power system. In IEEE Power Engi-
neering Society General Meeting, 2007, pages 1–8. IEEE, June 2007. ISBN
1-4244-1296-X. doi: 10.1109/PES.2007.386013.
[8] D. Kirschen and F. Bouffard. Keeping the lights on and the information
flowing. IEEE Power and Energy Magazine, 7(1):50–60, February 2009.
ISSN 1540-7977. doi: 10.1109/MPE.2008.930656.
[9] Zhaoxia Xie, G. Manimaran, V. Vittal, A. G Phadke, and V. Centeno.
An information architecture for future power systems and its reliability
analysis. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 17(3):857– 863, August
2002. ISSN 0885-8950. doi: 10.1109/TPWRS.2002.800971.
[10] Eric D. Knapp and Joel Langill. Industrial Network Security: Secur-
ing Critical Infrastructure Networks for Smart Grid, SCADA, and Other
Industrial Control Systems. Syngress, 1 edition, August 2011. ISBN
1597496456.
[11] Chee-Wooi Ten, Chen-Ching Liu, and G. Manimaran. Vulnerability as-
sessment of cybersecurity for SCADA systems. IEEE Transactions on
Power Systems, 23(4):1836–1846, November 2008. ISSN 0885-8950. doi:
10.1109/TPWRS.2008.2002298.
[12] S. Sridhar, A. Hahn, and M. Govindarasu. Cyber-physical system security
for the electric power grid. Proceedings of the IEEE, 100(1):210–224, 2012.
ISSN 0018-9219. doi: 10.1109/JPROC.2011.2165269.
[13] Chen-Ching Liu, A. Stefanov, Junho Hong, and P. Panciatici. Intruders
in the grid. Power and Energy Magazine, IEEE, 10(1):58 –66, February
2012. ISSN 1540-7977. doi: 10.1109/MPE.2011.943114.
[14] F. M Cleveland. Cyber security issues for advanced metering infrasttruc-
ture (AMI). In 2008 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting -
Conversion and Delivery of Electrical Energy in the 21st Century, pages
1–5. IEEE, July 2008. ISBN 978-1-4244-1905-0. doi: 10.1109/PES.2008.
4596535.
[15] D. Kundur, Xianyong Feng, Shan Liu, T. Zourntos, and K. L Butler-
Purry. Towards a framework for cyber attack impact analysis of the electric
182
Bibliography
smart grid. In 2010 First IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid
Communications (SmartGridComm), pages 244–249. IEEE, October 2010.
ISBN 978-1-4244-6510-1. doi: 10.1109/SMARTGRID.2010.5622049.
[16] Yanling Yuan, Zuyi Li, and Kui Ren. Modeling load redistribution attacks
in power systems. Smart Grid, IEEE Transactions on, 2(2):382 –390, June
2011. ISSN 1949-3053. doi: 10.1109/TSG.2011.2123925.
[17] Y. Yuan, Z. Li, and K. Ren. Quantitative analysis of load redistribution
attacks in power systems. Parallel and Distributed Systems, IEEE Trans-
actions on, PP(99):1, 2012. ISSN 1045-9219. doi: 10.1109/TPDS.2012.58.
[18] M. Negrete-Pincetic, F. Yoshida, and G. Gross. Towards quantifying the
impacts of cyber attacks in the competitive electricity market environment.
In PowerTech, 2009 IEEE Bucharest, pages 1–8. IEEE, July 2009. ISBN
978-1-4244-2234-0. doi: 10.1109/PTC.2009.5282237.
[19] A. Stefanov and Chen-Ching Liu. Cyber-power system security in a smart
grid environment. In Innovative Smart Grid Technologies (ISGT), 2012
IEEE PES, pages 1 –3, January 2012. doi: 10.1109/ISGT.2012.6175560.
[20] S. Sridhar and G. Manimaran. Data integrity attacks and their impacts on
SCADA control system. In 2010 IEEE Power and Energy Society General
Meeting, pages 1–6. IEEE, July 2010. ISBN 978-1-4244-6549-1. doi: 10.
1109/PES.2010.5590115.
[21] Siddharth Sridhar and G. Manimaran. Data integrity attack and its im-
pacts on voltage control loop in power grid. In 2011 IEEE Power and
Energy Society General Meeting, pages 1–6. IEEE, July 2011. ISBN 978-
1-4577-1000-1. doi: 10.1109/PES.2011.6039809.
[22] Jie Yan, Chen-Ching Liu, and M. Govindarasu. Cyber intrusion of wind
farm SCADA system and its impact analysis. In Power Systems Conference
and Exposition (PSCE), 2011 IEEE/PES, pages 1–6. IEEE, March 2011.
ISBN 978-1-61284-789-4. doi: 10.1109/PSCE.2011.5772593.
[23] A.-H. Mohsenian-Rad and A. Leon-Garcia. Distributed internet-based load
altering attacks against smart power grids. Smart Grid, IEEE Transactions




[24] Stacy Prowell, Rob Kraus, and Mike Borkin. CHAPTER 1 - denial of
service. In Seven Deadliest Network Attacks, pages 1–21. Syngress, Boston,
2010. ISBN 978-1-59749-549-3. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/B9781597495493000018.
[25] M. Long, Chwan-Hwa Wu, and J.Y. Hung. Denial of service attacks on
network-based control systems: impact and mitigation. Industrial Infor-
matics, IEEE Transactions on, 1(2):85 – 96, May 2005. ISSN 1551-3203.
doi: 10.1109/TII.2005.844422.
[26] Final report on the august 14th blackout in the united states and canada.
Technical report, U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, April
2004.
[27] G. N Ericsson. Information security for electric power utilities
(EPUs)CIGR07 developments on frameworks, risk assessment, and tech-
nology. IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, 24(3):1174–1181, July 2009.
ISSN 0885-8977. doi: 10.1109/TPWRD.2008.2008470.
[28] Pearson Ivan L.G. Smart grid cyber security for europe. Energy Policy,
39(9):5211–5218, September 2011. ISSN 0301-4215. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.
2011.05.043.
[29] J. Deuse, J. Dubois, R. Fanna, and I. Hamza. EWR under voltage load
shedding scheme. Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on, 12(4):1446 –
1454, November 1997. ISSN 0885-8950. doi: 10.1109/59.627840.
[30] H.E. Lokay and V. Burtnyk. Application of underfrequency relays for
automatic load shedding. Power Apparatus and Systems, IEEE Trans-
actions on, PAS-87(3):776 –783, March 1968. ISSN 0018-9510. doi:
10.1109/TPAS.1968.292193.
[31] F. Shokooh, J.J. Dai, S. Shokooh, J. Tastet, H. Castro, T. Khandelwal,
and G. Donner. Intelligent load shedding. Industry Applications Magazine,
IEEE, 17(2):44 –53, April 2011. ISSN 1077-2618. doi: 10.1109/MIAS.2010.
939814.
[32] S. Majumdar, D. Chattopadhyay, and J. Parikh. Interruptible load
management using optimal power flow analysis. Power Systems, IEEE




[33] R. Faranda, A. Pievatolo, and E. Tironi. Load shedding: A new proposal.
Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on, 22(4):2086 –2093, November 2007.
ISSN 0885-8950. doi: 10.1109/TPWRS.2007.907390.
[34] T. S.P Fernandes, J. R Lenzi, and M. A Mikilita. Load shedding strategies
using optimal load flow with relaxation of restrictions. IEEE Transactions
on Power Systems, 23(2):712–718, May 2008. ISSN 0885-8950. doi: 10.
1109/TPWRS.2008.919237.
[35] R. Baldick, B. Chowdhury, I. Dobson, Zhaoyang Dong, Bei Gou,
D. Hawkins, H. Huang, M. Joung, D. Kirschen, Fangxing Li, Juan Li,
Zuyi Li, Chen-Ching Liu, L. Mili, S. Miller, R. Podmore, K. Schneider,
Kai Sun, D. Wang, Zhigang Wu, Pei Zhang, Wenjie Zhang, and Xiaoping
Zhang. Initial review of methods for cascading failure analysis in electric
power transmission systems IEEE PES CAMS task force on understand-
ing, prediction, mitigation and restoration of cascading failures. In 2008
IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting - Conversion and Deliv-
ery of Electrical Energy in the 21st Century, pages 1–8. IEEE, July 2008.
ISBN 978-1-4244-1905-0. doi: 10.1109/PES.2008.4596430.
[36] I. Dobson, B. A Carreras, V. E Lynch, and D. E Newman. An initial model
fo complex dynamics in electric power system blackouts. In Proceedings
of the 34th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences,
2001, pages 710– 718. IEEE, January 2001. ISBN 0-7695-0981-9. doi:
10.1109/HICSS.2001.926274.
[37] I. Dobson, K. R Wierzbicki, Janghoon Kim, and Hui Ren. Towards
quantifying cascading blackout risk. In Bulk Power System Dynamics
and Control - VII. Revitalizing Operational Reliability, 2007 iREP Sym-
posium, pages 1–12. IEEE, August 2007. ISBN 978-1-4244-1519-9. doi:
10.1109/IREP.2007.4410554.
[38] T. Saksornchai, Wei-jen Lee, K. Methaprayoon, J.R. Liao, and R.J. Ross.
Improve the unit commitment scheduling by using the neural-network-
based short-term load forecasting. IEEE Transactions on Industry Ap-
plications, 41(1):169–179, 2005. ISSN 0093-9994. doi: 10.1109/TIA.2004.
841029.
[39] M. Rejc and M. Pantos. Short-term transmission-loss forecast for the slove-
nian transmission power system based on a fuzzy-logic decision approach.
185
Bibliography
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 26(3):1511–1521, 2011. ISSN 0885-
8950. doi: 10.1109/TPWRS.2010.2096829.
[40] A.K. Sinha and J.K. Mondal. Dynamic state estimator using ANN based
bus load prediction. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 14(4):1219
–1225, November 1999. ISSN 0885-8950. doi: 10.1109/59.801876.
[41] D.J. Trudnowski, W.L. McReynolds, and J.M. Johnson. Real-time very
short-term load prediction for power-system automatic generation control.
IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology, 9(2):254–260, 2001.
ISSN 1063-6536. doi: 10.1109/87.911377.
[42] Joe H. Chow, Felix F. Wu, and James A. Momoh, editors. Applied Math-
ematics for Restructured Electric Power Systems: Optimization, Control,
and Computational Intelligence. Springer, 2005 edition, November 2004.
ISBN 0387234705.
[43] A.A. El Desouky and M.M. Elkateb. Hybrid adaptive techniques for
electric-load forecast using ANN and ARIMA. Generation, Transmission
and Distribution, IEE Proceedings-, 147(4):213–217, 2000. ISSN 1350-2360.
doi: 10.1049/ip-gtd:20000521.
[44] J.W. Taylor and R. Buizza. Neural network load forecasting with weather
ensemble predictions. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 17(3):626–
632, 2002. ISSN 0885-8950. doi: 10.1109/TPWRS.2002.800906.
[45] Ching-Lai Hor, S.J. Watson, and S. Majithia. Daily load forecasting and
maximum demand estimation using ARIMA and GARCH. In Interna-
tional Conference on Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems,
2006. PMAPS 2006, pages 1–6, 2006. doi: 10.1109/PMAPS.2006.360237.
[46] N. Amjady. Short-term hourly load forecasting using time-series model-
ing with peak load estimation capability. IEEE Transactions on Power
Systems, 16(4):798–805, 2001. ISSN 0885-8950. doi: 10.1109/59.962429.
[47] M.T. Hagan and Suzanne M. Behr. The time series approach to short
term load forecasting. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2(3):785–
791, 1987. ISSN 0885-8950. doi: 10.1109/TPWRS.1987.4335210.
[48] J.W. Taylor and P.E. McSharry. Short-term load forecasting methods:
An evaluation based on european data. IEEE Transactions on Power
186
Bibliography
Systems, 22(4):2213–2219, 2007. ISSN 0885-8950. doi: 10.1109/TPWRS.
2007.907583.
[49] Tilmann Gneiting, Marc Genton, and Peter Guttorp. Geostatistical Space-
Time Models, Stationarity, Separability, and Full Symmetry. In Brbel
Finkenstdt, Leonhard Held, and Valerie Isham, editors, Statistical Methods
for Spatio-Temporal Systems, volume 107, pages 151–175. Chapman and
Hall/CRC, October 2006. ISBN 978-1-58488-593-1, 978-1-4200-1105-0.
[50] Dazhi Yang, Chaojun Gu, Zibo Dong, Panida Jirutitijaroen, Nan Chen,
and Wilfred M. Walsh. Solar irradiance forecasting using spatial-temporal
covariance structures and time-forward kriging. Renewable Energy, 60:
235–245, December 2013. ISSN 0960-1481. doi: 10.1016/j.renene.2013.
05.030. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0960148113002759.
[51] A. G. Journel and Ch J. Huijbregts. Mining Geostatistics. The Blackburn
Press, April 2004. ISBN 1930665911.
[52] W.S. Kerwin and J.L. Prince. The kriging update model and recursive
space-time function estimation. IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing,
47(11):2942–2952, 1999. ISSN 1053-587X. doi: 10.1109/78.796430.
[53] Hanefi Bayraktar and F. Sezer. Turalioglu. A kriging-based approach
for locating a sampling sitein the assessment of air quality. Stochastic
Environmental Research and Risk Assessment, 19(4):301–305, May 2005.
ISSN 1436-3240, 1436-3259. doi: 10.1007/s00477-005-0234-8. URL http:
//link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00477-005-0234-8.
[54] Paul D. Sampson and Peter Guttorp. Nonparametric estimation of non-
stationary spatial covariance structure. Journal of the American Statis-
tical Association, 87(417):108–119, March 1992. ISSN 0162-1459. doi:
10.2307/2290458. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/2290458. Arti-
cleType: research-article / Full publication date: Mar., 1992 / Copyright
1992 American Statistical Association.
187
Bibliography
[55] Martin Schlather. Construction of Covariance Functions and Uncondi-
tional Simulation of Random Fields. In Emilio Porcu, Jos-Mara Mon-
tero, and Martin Schlather, editors, Advances and Challenges in Space-
time Modelling of Natural Events, Lecture Notes in Statistics, pages 25–
54. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, January 2012. ISBN 978-3-642-17085-0,
978-3-642-17086-7.
[56] Carolina Garca-Ascanio and Carlos Mat. Electric power demand fore-
casting using interval time series: A comparison between VAR and
iMLP. Energy Policy, 38(2):715–725, February 2010. ISSN 0301-4215.
doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2009.10.007. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S0301421509007344.
[57] Helmut Lutkepohl. New introduction to multiple time series analysis.
Springer, Berlin, 2006. ISBN 3540262393 9783540262398.
[58] R.F. Nuqui and A.G. Phadke. Phasor measurement unit placement tech-
niques for complete and incomplete observability. Power Delivery, IEEE
Transactions on, 20(4):2381 – 2388, October 2005. ISSN 0885-8977. doi:
10.1109/TPWRD.2005.855457.
[59] Zhuo Lu, Xiang Lu, Wenye Wang, and C. Wang. Review and evaluation of
security threats on the communication networks in the smart grid. In MIL-
ITARY COMMUNICATIONS CONFERENCE, 2010 - MILCOM 2010,
pages 1830 –1835, November 2010. doi: 10.1109/MILCOM.2010.5679551.
[60] M. Brown Do Coutto Filho and J.C.S. de Souza. Forecasting-aided state
estimation-part i: Panorama. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 24
(4):1667 –1677, November 2009. ISSN 0885-8950. doi: 10.1109/TPWRS.
2009.2030295.
[61] A. Jain and N.R. Shivakumar. Power system tracking and dynamic state
estimation. In Power Systems Conference and Exposition, 2009. PSCE ’09.
IEEE/PES, pages 1 –8, March 2009. doi: 10.1109/PSCE.2009.4840192.
[62] A.S. Debs and R. Larson. A Dynamic Estimator for Tracking the State of a
Power System. IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, PAS-
89(7):1670–1678, 1970. ISSN 0018-9510. doi: 10.1109/TPAS.1970.292822.
188
Bibliography
[63] A.M. Leite da Silva, M.B. Do Coutto Filho, and J.F. de Queiroz. State
forecasting in electric power systems. Generation, Transmission and Dis-
tribution, IEE Proceedings C, 130(5):237 –244, September 1983. ISSN
0143-7046. doi: 10.1049/ip-c:19830046.
[64] G. Valverde and V. Terzija. Unscented kalman filter for power system
dynamic state estimation. IET Generation, Transmission Distribution, 5
(1):29 –37, January 2011. ISSN 1751-8687. doi: 10.1049/iet-gtd.2010.0210.
[65] M. Brown Do Coutto Filho, J.C.S. de Souza, and R.S. Freund. Forecasting-
aided state estimation-part II: implementation. IEEE Transactions on
Power Systems, 24(4):1678 –1685, November 2009. ISSN 0885-8950. doi:
10.1109/TPWRS.2009.2030297.
[66] P. Rousseaux, Th. Van Cutsem, and T.E. Dy Liacco. Whither dy-
namic state estimation? International Journal of Electrical Power
& Energy Systems, 12(2):104–116, April 1990. ISSN 0142-0615. doi:
10.1016/0142-0615(90)90006-W. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/014206159090006W.
[67] M. Nejati, N. Amjady, and H. Zareipour. A new stochastic search technique
combined with scenario approach for dynamic state estimation of power
systems. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 27(4):2093–2105, 2012.
ISSN 0885-8950. doi: 10.1109/TPWRS.2012.2195038.
[68] J. Stamp, A. McIntyre, and B. Ricardson. Reliability impacts from cyber
attack on electric power systems. In Power Systems Conference and Expo-
sition, 2009. PSCE ’09. IEEE/PES, pages 1–8. IEEE, March 2009. ISBN
978-1-4244-3810-5. doi: 10.1109/PSCE.2009.4840054.
[69] M. Panteli and D. S Kirschen. Assessing the effect of failures in the in-
formation and communication infrastructure on power system reliability.
In Power Systems Conference and Exposition (PSCE), 2011 IEEE/PES,
pages 1–7. IEEE, March 2011. ISBN 978-1-61284-789-4. doi: 10.1109/
PSCE.2011.5772565.
[70] K. Nishiya, J. Hasegawa, and T. Koike. Dynamic state estimation in-
cluding anomaly detection and identification for power systems. Genera-
tion, Transmission and Distribution, IEE Proceedings C, 129(5):192 –198,
September 1982. ISSN 0143-7046. doi: 10.1049/ip-c:19820032.
189
Bibliography
[71] Chun-Lien Su and Chan-Nan Lu. Interconnected network state esti-
mation using randomly delayed measurements. IEEE Transactions on
Power Systems, 16(4):870 –878, November 2001. ISSN 0885-8950. doi:
10.1109/59.962439.
[72] T.D. Larsen, N.A. Andersen, O. Ravn, and N.K. Poulsen. Incorporation of
time delayed measurements in a discrete-time kalman filter. In Proceedings
of the 37th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 1998, volume 4,
pages 3972 –3977 vol.4, December 1998. doi: 10.1109/CDC.1998.761918.
[73] A. Ray, L. W. Liou, and J. H. Shen. State estimation using randomly
delayed measurements. Journal of Dynamic Systems, Measurement, and
Control, 115(1):19, 1993. ISSN 00220434. doi: 10.1115/1.2897399. URL
http://link.aip.org/link/JDSMAA/v115/i1/p19/s1&Agg=doi.
[74] Noel Cressie and Christopher K. Wikle. Statistics for Spatio-Temporal
Data. Wiley, 1 edition, May 2011. ISBN 0471692743.
[75] Arthur R. Bergen and Vijay Vittal. Power Systems Analysis. Prentice
Hall, 2 edition, August 1999. ISBN 0136919901.
[76] Miang Zhao and A. Abur. Multi area state estimation using synchronized
phasor measurements. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 20(2):611–
617, 2005. ISSN 0885-8950. doi: 10.1109/TPWRS.2005.846209.
[77] IEEE standard for scada and automation systems, 2008.
[78] M. Chenine and L. Nordstrom. Modeling and simulation of wide-area com-
munication for centralized PMU-Based applications. IEEE Transactions
on Power Delivery, 26(3):1372 –1380, July 2011. ISSN 0885-8977. doi:
10.1109/TPWRD.2011.2106805.
[79] G. Hug and J.A. Giampapa. Vulnerability assessment of AC state esti-
mation with respect to false data injection cyber-attacks. IEEE Trans-
actions on Smart Grid, 3(3):1362–1370, 2012. ISSN 1949-3053. doi:
10.1109/TSG.2012.2195338.
[80] Q. Yang, J. Yang, W. Yu, D. An, N. Zhang, and W. Zhao. On false data
injection attacks against power system state estimation: Modeling and
countermeasures. IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems,
Early Access Online, 2013. ISSN 1045-9219. doi: 10.1109/TPDS.2013.92.
190
Bibliography
[81] Rakesh B Bobba, Katherine M Rogers, Qiyan Wang, Himanshu Khurana,
Klara Nahrstedt, and Thomas J Overbye. Detecting false data injection
attacks on dc state estimation. In Preprints of the First Workshop on
Secure Control Systems, CPSWEEK 2010, 2010.
[82] M. Talebi, Chaoyong Li, and Zhihua Qu. Enhanced protection against
false data injection by dynamically changing information structure of mi-
crogrids. In Sensor Array and Multichannel Signal Processing Workshop
(SAM), 2012 IEEE 7th, pages 393–396, June 2012. doi: 10.1109/SAM.
2012.6250520.
[83] Suzhi Bi and Y.J.A. Zhang. Defending mechanisms against false-data injec-
tion attacks in the power system state estimation. In 2011 IEEE GLOBE-
COM Workshops (GC Wkshps), pages 1162–1167, December 2011. doi:
10.1109/GLOCOMW.2011.6162362.
[84] S. Bhattarai, Linqiang Ge, and Wei Yu. A novel architecture against
false data injection attacks in smart grid. In 2012 IEEE International
Conference on Communications (ICC), pages 907–911, June 2012. doi:
10.1109/ICC.2012.6364511.
[85] O. Kosut, Liyan Jia, R.J. Thomas, and Lang Tong. Limiting false data
attacks on power system state estimation. In 2010 44th Annual Conference
on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS), pages 1–6, 2010. doi: 10.
1109/CISS.2010.5464816.
[86] O. Kosut, Liyan Jia, R.J. Thomas, and Lang Tong. On malicious data at-
tacks on power system state estimation. In Universities Power Engineering
Conference (UPEC), 2010 45th International, pages 1–6, 2010.
[87] Lanchao Liu, M. Esmalifalak, Qifeng Ding, V.A. Emesih, and Zhu Han.
Detecting False Data Injection Attacks on Power Grid by Sparse Optimiza-
tion. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 5(2):612–621, March 2014. ISSN
1949-3053. doi: 10.1109/TSG.2013.2284438.
[88] A Khatkhate, A Ray, E. Keller, S. Gupta, and S.C. Chin. Symbolic time-
series analysis for anomaly detection in mechanical systems. IEEE/ASME




[89] Dipankar Dasgupta and Stephanie Forrest. Novelty Detection in Time
Series Data using Ideas from Immunology. 1995.
[90] Stan Salvador, Philip Chan, and John Brodie. Learning States and Rules
for Time Series Anomaly Detection. In FLAIRS Conference, pages 306–
311, 2004.
[91] Thomas M. Cover and Joy A. Thomas. Elements of Information Theory.
Wiley-Interscience, New York, NY, USA, 1991. ISBN 0-471-06259-6.
[92] M.N. Do and M. Vetterli. Wavelet-based texture retrieval using generalized
Gaussian density and Kullback-Leibler distance. IEEE Transactions on
Image Processing, 11(2):146–158, February 2002. ISSN 1057-7149. doi:
10.1109/83.982822.
[93] Hui Lin, Zhijian Ou, and Xi Xiao. Generalized Time-Series Active Search
With Kullback-Leibler Distance for Audio Fingerprinting. IEEE Signal
Processing Letters, 13(8):465–468, August 2006. ISSN 1070-9908. doi:
10.1109/LSP.2006.874394.
[94] Shanbao Tong, Zhengjun Li, Yisheng Zhu, and N.V. Thakor. Describing
the Nonstationarity Level of Neurological Signals Based on Quantifications
of Time -Frequency Representation. IEEE Transactions on Biomedical
Engineering, 54(10):1780–1785, October 2007. ISSN 0018-9294. doi: 10.
1109/TBME.2007.893497.
[95] R. Lukomski and K. Wilkosz. Utilization of support vector machine clas-
sifiers to power system topology verification. In Modern Electric Power
Systems (MEPS), 2010 Proceedings of the International Symposium, pages
1–6, 2010.
[96] R. Lukomski and K. Wilkosz. Power system topology verification using
artificial neural networks: maximum utilization of measurement data. In
Power Tech Conference Proceedings, 2003 IEEE Bologna, volume 3, pages
7 pp. Vol.3–, 2003. doi: 10.1109/PTC.2003.1304451.
[97] K.A. Clements and P.W. Davis. Detection and identification of topology
errors in electric power systems. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 3
(4):1748–1753, 1988. ISSN 0885-8950. doi: 10.1109/59.192991.
192
Bibliography
[98] F.F. Wu and W.-H.E. Liu. Detection of topology errors by state estima-
tion [power systems]. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 4(1):176–183,
1989. ISSN 0885-8950. doi: 10.1109/59.32475.
[99] Jian Chen and A. Abur. Improved topology error detection via optimal
measurement placement. In 2008 IEEE Power and Energy Society Gen-
eral Meeting - Conversion and Delivery of Electrical Energy in the 21st
Century, pages 1–6, 2008. doi: 10.1109/PES.2008.4596316.
[100] N. Singh and H. Glavitsch. Detection and identification of topological
errors in online power system analysis. IEEE Transactions on Power Sys-
tems, 6(1):324–331, 1991. ISSN 0885-8950. doi: 10.1109/59.131079.
[101] Peter G V Axelberg, I.Y.-H. Gu, and M. H J Bollen. Support Vector
Machine for Classification of Voltage Disturbances. IEEE Transactions on
Power Delivery, 22(3):1297–1303, 2007. ISSN 0885-8977. doi: 10.1109/
TPWRD.2007.900065.
[102] D. Thukaram, H. P. Khincha, and H. P. Vijaynarasimha. Artificial neural
network and support vector Machine approach for locating faults in radial
distribution systems. IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, 20(2):710–
721, 2005. ISSN 0885-8977. doi: 10.1109/TPWRD.2005.844307.
[103] Hsuan-Tien Lin and Chih-Jen Lin. A Study on Sigmoid Kernels for
SVM and the Training of non-PSD Kernels by SMO-type Methods.
Technical report, Department of Computer Science and Information En-
gineering, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan, 2003. URL
http://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/cjlin/papers/tanh.pdf. Available at
http://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/cjlin/papers/tanh.pdf.
[104] Asa Ben-Hur and Jason Weston. A Users Guide to Support Vector Ma-
chines. In Oliviero Carugo and Frank Eisenhaber, editors, Data Mining
Techniques for the Life Sciences, number 609 in Methods in Molecular
Biology, pages 223–239. Humana Press, January 2010. ISBN 978-1-60327-
240-7, 978-1-60327-241-4. URL http://link.springer.com.libproxy1.
nus.edu.sg/protocol/10.1007/978-1-60327-241-4_13.
[105] M. Pal and G.M. Foody. Feature Selection for Classification of Hyper-
spectral Data by SVM. IEEE Transactions on Geoscience and Remote
193
Bibliography
Sensing, 48(5):2297–2307, 2010. ISSN 0196-2892. doi: 10.1109/TGRS.
2009.2039484.
[106] Simon S Haykin. Neural networks: a comprehensive foundation. Prentice
Hall, Upper Saddle River, N.J., 1999. ISBN 0132733501 9780132733502
0139083855 9780139083853.
[107] Blackout on Capitol Hill after reported power plant ex-
plosion, April 2015. URL http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/
official-power-plant-blast-responsible-dc-power-outages.
[108] J. Salmeron, K. Wood, and R. Baldick. Analysis of electric grid security
under terrorist threat. Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on, 19(2):905
– 912, May 2004. ISSN 0885-8950. doi: 10.1109/TPWRS.2004.825888.
[109] D. Kushner. The real story of stuxnet. IEEE Spectrum, 50(3):48–53, March
2013. ISSN 0018-9235. doi: 10.1109/MSPEC.2013.6471059.
[110] Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. The
MIT Press, first edition, July 1994. ISBN 0262650401.
[111] A.M. Colman. Game Theory and Its Applications in the Social and Bi-
ological Sciences. International series in social psychology. Butterworth-
Heinemann, 1995. ISBN 9780750623698. URL https://books.google.
com.sg/books?id=75DSyyqiG34C.
[112] Mark Felegyhazi and Jean pierre Hubaux. 1 game theory in wireless net-
works: A tutorial, 2006.
[113] Martin J. Osborne. A course in game theory, 1994.
[114] W. Saad, Zhu Han, H.V. Poor, and T. Basar. Game-theoretic methods
for the smart grid: An overview of microgrid systems, demand-side man-
agement, and smart grid communications. Signal Processing Magazine,
IEEE, 29(5):86–105, Sept 2012. ISSN 1053-5888. doi: 10.1109/MSP.2012.
2186410.
[115] Kong-wei Lye and Jeannette M. Wing. Game strategies in network security.
International Journal of Information Security, 4(1-2):71–86, 2005. ISSN




[116] Tansu Alpcan and S. Buchegger. Security games for vehicular networks.
Mobile Computing, IEEE Transactions on, 10(2):280–290, Feb 2011. ISSN
1536-1233. doi: 10.1109/TMC.2010.146.
[117] Pin-Yu Chen, Shin-Ming Cheng, and Kwang-Cheng Chen. Smart attacks
in smart grid communication networks. IEEE Communications Magazine,
50(8):24–29, 2012. ISSN 0163-6804. doi: 10.1109/MCOM.2012.6257523.
[118] T. Basar. The gaussian test channel with an intelligent jammer. IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, 29(1):152–157, 1983. ISSN 0018-
9448. doi: 10.1109/TIT.1983.1056602.
[119] Tansu Alpcan and S. Buchegger. Security games for vehicular networks.
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 10(2):280–290, 2011. ISSN 1536-
1233. doi: 10.1109/TMC.2010.146.
[120] S. Roy, C. Ellis, S. Shiva, D. Dasgupta, V. Shandilya, and Qishi Wu. A
survey of game theory as applied to network security. In 2010 43rd Hawaii
International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS), pages 1–10, 2010.
doi: 10.1109/HICSS.2010.35.
[121] Tamer Basar and Geert Jan Olsder. Dynamic Noncooperative Game The-
ory. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2 edition, January
1999. ISBN 089871429X.
[122] L. Campos. Fuzzy linear programming models to solve fuzzy matrix games.
Fuzzy Sets Syst., 32(3):275289, September 1989. ISSN 0165-0114. doi: 10.
1016/0165-0114(89)90260-1. URL http://dx.doi.org.libproxy1.nus.
edu.sg/10.1016/0165-0114(89)90260-1.
195
